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The ALI’s Restatement (Third) of Restitution provides one of the most 
interesting expressions of contemporary legal conceptualism.  This paper 
explores the theory and practice of post-realist conceptualism through a review 
and critique of the Restatement. At the theoretical level, the paper develops a 
typology of different forms of conceptualism, and shows that the Restatement 
has more in common with the high formalism of the nineteenth century than 
with contemporary modes of private law discourse.  At the level of substantive 
doctrine, the paper explains why labels in fact make a difference, and assesses 
which recoveries are more (and less) likely under the Restatement’s scheme.  
The final section returns to consider why the Restatement reprises the 
jurisprudence of classical formalism.  I suggest that the mythos of legal 
conceptualism is necessary for introducing a new field that claims to reflect 
foundational principles of the common law’s system of private ordering. Further 
this mode of discourse helps overcome the dissonance of creating a new field of 
law in a work that purports to restate existing doctrine.
Introduction 
It has been widely observed that many of the so-called core doctrines of the 
common law are actually the inventions legal scholars in the late nineteenth century.1
Before that time, the law was organized around the procedures embedded in the medieval 
forms of action rather than around substantive categories such as contract and tort.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, legal theorists reorganized the existing rules, 
changing some, and providing updated rationales for others, and created a more systemic 
approach to law based on rationalized legal principles. 2 This systematization program 
has had considerable impact on the structure of legal thought, and contemporary private 
law doctrine is still charted largely on nineteenth-century coordinates.   
 
Conceptualism is the central analytic tools associated with this period.  While the 
term sustains many definitions, central to all is that numerous lower-level rules (the 
individual rules of law used to decide cases) are connected to each other through a legal 
concept that is more general and abstract than the rules themselves.  For example, the 
specific rule against reliance damages in contract reflects the general concept that a 
contract enforces the agreement between the parties.  The doctrine of duress might be 
explained along similar lines, as it refuses to enforce an agreement whose consent is 
 
1 See, e.g., James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1817-21 (2000). 
2 Id. 
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illusory.  Overall, conceptualism is a useful tool for developing a systematic account of 
law because it shows how a multitude of individual cases can be subsumed under a single 
organizing principle (concept).   Further, the conceptual account portrays law as a series 
interrelated decisions that are connected though a common analytical basis. In turn, these 
concepts are derived through a scientific study of the law’s raw material; reported cases.  
 
Conceptualism is also said to promote predictability.  Even the most 
comprehensive legal system cannot have a rule that covers every case, and if tried it 
would result in hundreds of conflicting and overlapping rules.  Conceptualism solves this 
problem by claiming that the concept, together with rigorous legal analysis, can produce 
the correct result to every legal question, even if no specific rule was previously stated.  
The legal concept is thus greater than the sum of the underlying parts because it ensures 
that there are no (or very few) gaps in system. This serves the values of legal 
determinacy, the rule of law and judicial restraint. 
 
Since the early decades of the twentieth century however, this version of classical 
legal thought has been subject to successive rounds of criticism by nearly every 
generation of scholars.  Legal realism, conceptualism’s chief antagonist, expresses deep 
suspicion towards interlocking systems of legal rules, arguing, “judges respond primarily 
to the facts of the case, rather than to the legal rules and reasons.”3 Further, realists 
demonstrated that the concepts were easily manipulated, so that a skillful advocate could 
deduce a number of conflicting rules from a single general concept.  In one way or 
another, realists believe that the actual basis of legal decisions lie outside of the formal 
boundaries of the law, and that law is far more influenced by economic political and 
social factors that the conceptualist vision admits. In time, the realist position became the 
orthodoxy in academic circles and classical conceptualism ceased to be a respectable 
mode of legal argument. 
3 BRIAN LEITER, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 50, (W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2004) (describing the “core claim” of legal realism).  
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Of late, the common law of restitution, alternately called the law of unjust 
enrichment, has entered a second wave of conceptualization.  If restitution sounds 
unfamiliar, fear not.  Until a few years ago even the former dean of Columbia Law 
School and director of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) was not quite sure what it 
meant either.4 This lack of awareness is often blamed on the fact that despite some 
initial efforts, the late nineteenth century theorists essentially ‘forgot’ about restitution as 
they went about creating contract and tort.5 Despite some initial stirrings surrounding the 
publication of the first Restatement on Restitution, one can credibly argue that restitution 
does not exist in American law. 6
4 See Lance Liebman Forward, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, ix-xi (Discussion Draft, 2000). 
5 See James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV 1815, 1870 (2000). 
While the degree of 19th and early 20th century neglect should not be overstated, see, e.g, Joseph Perillo,  
Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208  (1973), restitution was never understood to 
be a core legal category in the manner of contract and tort.  
6 Although proving that something does not exist is difficult, it’s quite apparent that restitution has not 
grabbed the US academy. Since 1980, I am aware of only one book published on the American law of 
restitution—one written by an Israeli law professor and published by an English publisher (Cambridge 
Univ. Press), which itself contains for more non-US references and materials than a comparative work on 
torts or contracts. Hanoch Dagan, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION. The lone treatise is a product of 
the 1970’s and reflects the scholarly modality of a different era. George Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 
(1978). And while a second Restatement of Restitution was begun in the mid 1980’s but was aborted after 
only two drafts were published.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984). Further, I am not aware of 
a single course in the 170+ US law schools devoted to restitution, nor, should a school want to offer such a 
course, is there any current casebook specifically addressing this field. 
Further, searching for articles with the title words “restitution,” “unjust enrichment”, “change of position” 
“quasi contract” and “constructive trust” in the law reviews of first and second tiered schools since 
01/01/2000 (and throwing out articles dealing with restitution in the criminal law sense) produced the 
following: Andrew Kull, Restitution's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, (2003);  Mark Gergen, 
Symposium: A Tribute to Professor Joseph M. Perillo Restitution as a Bridge Over Troubled Contractual 
Water, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, (2002); Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU 
L. REV. 1577, (2002); Andrew Kull. Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 BU. L. REV. 919 
(2001)  Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 695, (2001) (which is actually a critique of the Birks-Kull model of restitution, and 3 book reviews 
of Hanoch Dagan’s recent book. (Sherwin, Wienrib and Gergen). In addition there have been two symposia 
dedicated to restitution as understood by Professor Kull.  In the first, Symposium: Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1763-2197, (2001) only 3 of the 12 articles were written by US-based law 
professors.  In the second, Second Remedies Discussion Forum: Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L REV. 991 
(2003), the numbers more balanced (9/14 papers by US-based scholars).   
In any event this rather meager output should be compared with the explosion of commonwealth 
restitution scholarship in the past twenty years. An incomplete and unorganized list recent of books 
includes, UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Hart Oxford 2004); RESTITUTION, PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GARETH JONES (Hart Oxford (1998) (Cornish ed.); IN SEARCH OF 
PRINCIPLE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY (Oxford 1999) (Swadling ed.); RESTITUTION 
(Lionel D. Smith ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000); Andrew Burrows, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION,
(Butterworths: London 2.ed, 2002; 1.d ed. (1993); Robert Stevens, RESTITUTION IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, 2003); Hanoch Dagan, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
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This is, however, changing.  Following developments in the Commonwealth and 
Europe, there is a push for the American common law to recognize the field of 
restitution.  Leading this effort is the ALI, and the emerging drafts of the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.7 The Restatement’s central goal is to 
 
RESTITUTION (Cambridge Press, 2004);  Jacques Etienne du Plessis, COMPULSION AND RESTITUTION: A
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TREATMENT OF COMPULSION IN SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 
WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ITS RELEVANCE TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUSTIFIED 
ENRICHMENT (Edinburgh  Stair Society, 2004); UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (P.W.L. Russell, ed.) (Amsterdam VU University Press, 1996); George B. 
Klippert, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Toronto Butterworths, 1983); UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION  (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed.) (Berlin  Duncker & Humblot, 1995); 
Mitchell McInnes, RESTITUTION: DEVELOPMENTS IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Deakin Law School, Legal 
Resources Project, 1996); Andrew Burrows and Ewan McKendrick CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW 
OF RESTITUTION (Oxford University Press, 1997); THE RESTITUTION RESEARCH RESOURCE (Oxford, 
England Mansfield Press, 1994); Peter Birks, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985); Jack Beatson, THE USE AND ABUSE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT: ESSAYS ON THE LAW 
OF RESTITUTION (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1991); LAW COMMISSION [OF GREAT BRITAIN], RESTITUTION 
OF PAYMENTS MADE UNDER A MISTAKE OF LAW (London: H.M.S.O. 1991); Peter Birks, RESTITUTION:
THE FUTURE (Annandale, New South Wales: Federation Press, 1992.); New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW (Sydney: New South Wales 
Law Reform Comm. 1987); Scottish Law Commission, RECOVERY OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER 
ERROR OF LAW (Edinburgh: Scottish Law Commission, 1993). RESTITUTION AND BANKING LAW (Francis 
D. Rose, eds.) (Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998); RESTITUTION AND INSOLVENCY (Francis Rose ed.) 
(Mansfield Press 2000) Andrew Skelton, RESTITUTION AND CONTRACT (Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998);. 
Ian McNeil Jackman, THE VARIETIES OF RESTITUTION (Sydney, Federation Press, 1998); Goff and Jones, 
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, (London, Sweet and Maxwell 1998) (now in its fifth edition); Peter Birks, 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Oxford, 2005) (second edition); Lionel Smith, THE LAW OF TRACING (Oxford 1997); 
Craig Rotherham, PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN CONTEXT (Hart Pub. Oxford 2002); Steve Hedley, 
RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING (London Sweet & Maxwell 2001); THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 
(Hedely & Halliwell eds.) (Butterworths 2002). 
7 At present, the drafts of the Restatement Third include, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Discussion Draft, March 2000) [hereinafter Discussion Draft; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 2001 [hereinafter 
Tentative Draft No. 1]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, April 2002) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 3, March 2004) (hereinafter “Tentative Draft No. 3”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 2005) 
[hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 4]. In each draft, the ALI is careful to note that: 
As of the date of publication, this Draft has not been considered by the members 
of The American Law Institute and does not represent the position of the 
Institute on any of the issues with which it deals. The action, if any, taken by the 
members with respect to this Draft may be ascertained by consulting the Annual 
Proceedings of the Institute, which are published following each Annual 
Meeting. 
As used in this article the term “Restatement” represents the views of tentative drafts which have 
not, as of yet, received the ALI’s sanction. Nevertheless, participants at the ALI meetings have 
noted that Kull’s views face little to no opposition from the membership.  See Mark Gergen, The 
Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Midpoint, 56 Current Legal Problems 
289, 291 n.10 (2003). 
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convince the American legal public that restitution is a doctrinal category like contract 
and tort which itself can be a source of legal rights and liabilities.8 According to the 
Restatement, liability can be said to lie in restitution, much as we currently speak of 
liability arising in contract and tort. 
 
The Restatement makes its case by arguing that while the name might be new, the 
idea of restitution has existed all along, even if no one quite noticed it.  Taking a page 
from the conceptualism of the classical legal theorists, the Restatement claims that a large 
number of doctrines going by the names of quasi contract, quantum meruit, implied 
contracts, constructive trusts, equitable liens and equitable subrogation and others, are in 
fact unified by a single idea known as unjust enrichment.  Going forward, courts are to 
expressly proclaim that they are dealing with restitution issues and decide these cases 
according to the rules and principles of restitution.  
 
The Restatement’s project raises several questions.  How exactly does a group of 
scholars go about “inventing” a new legal field?  Can law just be made up; And will 
anyone listen?  Second, what does it mean for the law to be conceptualized and 
rationalized? How is this different than the usual process of grounding decisions in 
precedent and logical argument? Third, what is the practical impact of the Restatement 
project, does conceptualization make any difference, or is it simply a matter of putting a 
different label on an existing doctrine? Fourth, if restitution, like contract and tort is 
really a fundamental basis of liability, how come no one has ever heard of it? And why 
do we all of a sudden need it now? Finally, why does the law of restitution warrant a 
return to the mode of legal thinking that has been out of fashion for most of the twentieth 
century? 
This article answers these questions in five Parts.  Part I reviews the work product 
of the Restatement and explains how the it transforms the mass of seemingly unrelated 
doctrines into a unified conceptual field.  Part II evaluates the Restatement’s analysis and 
explores the assumptions underlying the Restatement’s legal conceptualism.  Part III 
 
8 See Lance Liebman Forward, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, ix-xi (Discussion Draft, 2000). 
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examines the Restatement’s jurisprudence in terms of other expressions of post-realist 
conceptualism.  Part IV turns to assess the impact of conceptualization on substantive 
doctrine.  Part V concludes examining why, after nearly a century in exile, does classical 
legal thought makes a comeback in the Restatement of Restitution.  
 
I. The Restatement Project 
 
How is a legal field created?  A review of the Restatement drafts and the scholarly 
writings of its principal architect, Professor Andrew Kull, reveals four basic moves.  
First, restitution is shown to be a body of positive law that accounts for recoveries not 
captured by traditional contract and tort doctrine.  Second, restitution is defined in terms 
of unjust enrichment, which provides the conceptual underpinning for a large number of 
existing doctrines.  Third, the constituent sub-doctrines are restructured to accord with 
unjust enrichment principles.  Finally, doctrines that cannot be made to conform are 
expelled from restitution’s orbit.   
 
A.   Restitution as a substantive field 
1. Background 
While elements of restitution have been around at least since Lord Mansfield’s 
time, its modern incarnation is largely the product of scholarship of the late nineteenth 
and early- to-mid twentieth centuries.9 Although William Keener first published a 
treatise on the law of quasi-contract in 1893, the term “restitution” is generally credited to 
Professors Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, 10 the authors of the first Restatement on 
Restitution. Seavey and Scott combined the learning on quasi contracts with the 
constructive trust and other remedies stemming from equity.11 
They claimed: 
9 The history of the development of the law of quasi-contracts is charted out in DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 177-181. 
10 Seavey and Scott seemed aware that they were introducing it to the world, see W. Seavey & A. Scott, 
Restitution, 54 L. Q. R. 29, 31 (1938) See also Peter Birks, A Letter to America, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIER 
discussing the naming of the First Restatement.  
11 See RESTATEMENT ON RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (1937). 
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In bringing [a number of recurring] situations together under one 
heading, the [American Law] Institute expresses the conviction 
that they are all subject to one unitary principle which heretofore 
has not had general recognition.  In this it has recognized the 
tripartite division of the law into contracts, torts, and restitution, 
the division being made with reference to the purpose which each 
subject serves in protecting one of three fundamental interests.12 
Seavey and Scott further argued that restitution: 
 
is a third [branch of the common law], sometimes overlapping with 
the others, but different in its purpose. This third postulate, which 
underlies the rules assembled in the Restatement under the heading 
‘Restitution,’ can be expressed as thus: A person has a right to 
have restored to him a benefit gained at his expense by another, if 
the retention of the benefit by the other would be unjust.13 
Despite the efforts of the first Restatement, and those of mid-century American 
scholars, most notably, John Dawson’s Unjust Enrichment, George Palmer’s treatise, The 
Law of Restitution and John Wade’s casebook, Cases and Materials on Restitution,14 
restitution law and scholarship has largely disappeared from the American scene. While 
the law of quasi contracts and constructive trusts is undeniably part of American law, the 
idea, that restitution is its own body of law with policies and principles that are distinct 
from contract and tort has not caught on in American jurisprudence.  
 
The modern Restatement looks to revive, and in many ways improve upon, these 
earlier efforts.  Restitution is needed because “orthodox tort” and contract law do not 
account for a number of established doctrines.15 Unjust enrichment “describes[s] the 
fundamental basis for liability in restitution,”16 and “restitution (meaning the law of 
 
12 W. Seavey & A. Scott, Restitution, 54 L. Q. R. 29, 31 (1938).  In the first Restatement these cases are 
organized under the following headings: Mistake, Coercion, Benefits Conferred at Request, Benefits 
voluntarily conferred without mistake coercion or request, benefits lawfully acquired which are not 
conferred by the person claiming restitution, and benefits tortuously acquired. Id.
13 Id. at 32. 
14 First edition 1958, Second edition 1966. 
15 Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1192-93 (1995) [hereinafter 
Rationalizing]; see also Discussion Draft §1 Cmt.a  (“Restitution is a coordinate basis of liability that, 
taken together with principles of contract and torts complete the account of civil obligations in our legal 
system.”)   
 
16 Discussion Draft, supra note 8, § 1 at 3.  
The Reemergence of Restitution 
 
9
unjust or unjustified enrichment) is itself the source of obligations, analogous in this 
respect to tort or contract.”17 However, by using a slight yet important shift in language, 
the new Restatement pushes the conceptual account of restitution one step further.  In the 
first Restatement, ‘restitution’ is used as a concrete noun: “[a] person who has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.” 
Here, ‘restitution’ signifies the nature of the payment.18 The new Restatement by 
contrast, uses the term as an abstract noun where restitution is presented as the source of 
legal liability; thus “[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another 
is liable in restitution to the other.”19 
2. Positivizing the law
Bringing restitution into the common law fold involves convincing courts that it is 
a legitimate area of the law with defined rules that are predictably applied.  The 
Restatement is operating both against ignorance and indifference to restitution on the one 
hand and ambivalence, or even hostility on the other.  The hostility is predicated on 
assuming that restitution is little more than accumulated bits of discretion garbed as 
doctrine. Despite the Restatement’s dismissal,  this view traces back to the birth of unjust 
enrichment under Lord Mansfield, who held “[i]n one word, the gist of this kind of action 
is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural 
justice and equity to refund the money.”20 Inevitably, the association of unjust 
enrichment with natural law and equity, together with the historical fact that at least parts 
of the law of restitution trace their origin to courts of equity (and the subsequent mis-
 
17 Discussion Draft, supra note 8, § 1 at 12-13. 
18 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1938) (emphasis added). 
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Discussion Draft, 2000) (emphasis added). Both of these 
formulations contrast sharply with the language of the aborted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION 
§1, Which reads, “A person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another person’s 
interest, or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to 
prevent unjust enrichment.”   
Two important differences emerge. First, the Restatement(Second) envisions restitution as based 
on plaintiff’s loss rather than the exclusive focus on defendant’s gain that is mandated by the first and third 
Restatements.  Second, the Restatement( Second)’s definition stresses restitution’s remedial rather than 
substantive role. Restitution is described as a remedy to enforce rights generated elsewhere (presumably by 
tort or contract) rather than as its own source of substantive rights and duties coequal to tort and contract.  
20 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760) (capitalization modernized). 
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association of the equity courts as standardless), generated an aversion to restitution and 
led to its banishment to the nether regions of the common law. 21 
The Restatement by contrast, presents restitution as a positivized, rule-based legal 
field.  Its opening section claims that “instances of unjustified enrichment are both 
predictable and objectively determined,” in part because “the justification is legal not 
moral.”22 In support, the Restatement points to several morally questionable transactions 
and, (with apparent pride), asserts that the law of restitution offers no recourse.23 
Similarly, the Restatement’s conceptual formality is designed to ensure that restitution 
follows precise deductive techniques that restrict the imposition of judicial will on 
transacting parties.   
 
3.  Terminological clean-up
For all of the cheerleading for the coherent, positive view of restitution, deep 
confusion and uncertainty remain.  Terminology in this area is notoriously slippery and, 
assuming the Restatement’s definition, wildly misleading.  In ordinary usage, ‘restitution’ 
means giving something back.  A thief who returns stolen property, money returned when 
a contract is unwound, and returning money paid by mistake are all acts of restitution: in 
each case the plaintiff is restored to his original position.24 The Restatement however, 
posits that restitution is defined as unjust enrichment—a principle that focuses 
exclusively on defendant’s unjustified gain rather than on plaintiff’s loss and desire for 
compensation.  Upon further examination however, “unjust enrichment” is only slightly 
more precise.25 The term begs for an external baseline to assess the justness of a given 
transaction. Indeed, the Restatement notes that the favored locution is actually 
“unjustified enrichment,”26 a term conveying that the transaction is unjustified as a matter 
 
21 See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 2083 (discussing various definitions of the term “equity as it relates to the law on unjust 
enrichment). 
22 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  at § 1 Cmt. b.  
23 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,   § 1, Illustration 1 & 2.  
24 See Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1191-92.  
25 Discussion Draft , supra note 8,  § 1 at 2-4. 
26 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,   § 1 at 1-4.  This in the term favored by many non-American restitution 
scholars. See Reporters notes to § 1 Cmt. b. at 13. A more complete account of these terms is available in 
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of positive law rather than resting on amorphous notions of morality and policy. Despite 
good arguments for abandoning this terminology, the Restatement concludes that 
“restitution” and “unjust enrichment” are too entrenched in the American legal 
consciousness to be removed at this point.27 
Terminological reform extends beyond the main subject heading.  The 
Restatement sets out to collect numerous doctrines from all over the common law 
landscape and locate them within restitution-unjust enrichment framework.  By way of 
example, actions for recovery of payments remitted under a mistake of fact have often 
been explained in terms of quasi contract and money had and received.28 Similarly 
actions to reform or rewrite property deeds premised on mistakes (i.e. the deed records a 
different parcel than buyer or seller agreed to exchange) are typically understood as 
“actions in equity” appended to the law of property. 29 The Restatement resists this 
unprincipled classification based on the outmoded forms of action or the jurisdictional 
quirks of the pre-modern common law.  Instead, it describes each of these doctrines as 
the law’s response to prevent unjust enrichment that would inevitably occur if no remedy 
was offered.30 
The “law” of restitution is thus comprised of a litany of doctrines going under 
various names and guises.  These include elements of quasi contract, contract implied-in-
law, quantum meruit, assumpsit, constructive trust, replevin, equitable lien and 
subrogation, recession, reformation, and so on. 31 While the Restatement is quick to 
jettison this archaic terminology, courts have not quite caught up.32 Most notably in this 
 
Francesco Giglio, A Systematic Approach to “Unjust” and “Unjustified” Enrichment, 23 OX. J. LEG. STUD.
455 (2003). 
27 See Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 1 Reporters notes to Cmt. b. at 13. (“The term ‘unjust enrichment’ 
is too firmly fixed as the keystone of American restitution to be replaced without harm to the structure. 
Given a free choice, ‘unjustified enrichment’ might well be preferable….”). See also Rationalizing, supra 
note 16, at 1212-13.  
28 See Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Intl., 570 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 1991). 
29 E.g., Worley v. White Tire of Tenn., Inc.,182 S.W.3d 306 (Tenn. Ct. App., 2005); Wright v. Sampson, 830 
N.E.2d 1022, (Ind. App., 2005); See also Tentative Draft No. 1, § 12, Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. at p.171. 
30 See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 8,  § 12 Cmt a. See id. § 6 Illustration 2. 
31 See e.g, Dan B. Dobbs, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.2-4.3 (2d ed. 1993).  
32 Looking only at the more unusual terminology, see, e.g., Jantzen Beach Assocs., LLC v. Jantzen 
Dynamic Corp. 200 Or. App. 458, 115 P.3d 943, 2005 WL 1580248 (Or. App., July 26 2005) (Property 
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regard are references to “equity,” “quasi contract,” “implied contract,” quantum meruit”
and “constructive trust,” terms that the Restatement consciously omits but which remain 
the operative terminology in nearly every case presenting unjust enrichment issues.33 
Surveying the literature on restitution in 1968, Professor Wade found that the 
American Digest System (West) had no entry for “unjust enrichment, restitution, or quasi 
contract,” and that one had to look to more than twenty-five entries to cobble together the 
rules that the Restatement presents as restitution.34 While in the succeeding years the 
situation has been somewhat ameliorated, the core of his insight remains intact.  
 
B. Restitution as Unjust Enrichment 
The Restatement’s guiding conceptual principle is: 
 [T]he law of restitution be defined exclusively in terms of its core 
idea, the law of unjust enrichment. By this definition it would be 
axiomatic (i) that no liability could be asserted in restitution other 
than one referable to the unjust enrichment of the defendant, and 
(ii) that the measure of recovery in restitution must in every case 
be the extent of the defendant's unjust enrichment.35 
The insistence that unjust enrichment provide the basis for restitution is quite 
exacting.  “In the absence of benefit, there can be no liability in restitution; nor can the 
measure of liability in restitution exceed the measure of the defendant’s enrichment.”36 
owner brought action for assumpsit against neighboring owner arising from defendants’ violation of a 
restrictive covenant); Morfin v. Estate of Martinez, 831 N.E.2d 791, 2005 WL 1734987 (Ind. App., July 26, 
2005) (action regarding constructive trust on life insurance proceeds and pension benefits); Carthaginian 
Financial Corp. v. Skinner, Inc. Slip Copy, 2005 WL 1388689 (D.Vt., June 3, 2005) (breach of contract and 
replevin actions regarding sale of artwork); Chorman v. McCormick 172 S.W.3d 22, 2005 WL 1634014 
(Tex. App. July 12, 2005) (former father-in-law seeks equitable lien on former daughter-in-law's one-half 
interest in real property); Federal Ins Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins Co., 415 F.3d 487, 
2005 WL 1594354 (6th Cir. July 8, 2005) (insurer brought suit as equitable subrogee against second 
insurer, seeking to recoup payment on basis that loss resulting from mechanical breakdown of leased 
equipment). 
33 See, e.g. 1 Palmer §1.1 (Supp 2006) (citing hundreds of cases displaying the terminological and 
conceptual confusion). 
34 See John Wade, The Literature of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS. L.J. 1087, 1097 (1968).  
35 Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1196. See also the blackletter rule of Discussion Draft § 1 which states: 
“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another person is liable in restitution to the other.” See 
supra note 20 discussing the evolution of the term restitution.  
36 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 2 Cmt.d at 17.  
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Moreover, “cases inconsistent [with these principles of restitution] will henceforth 
require either a different rationale or a different result.”37 
This approach does not have the support of leading scholars.38 Even the first 
Restatement, in many ways the model for the latest incarnation, takes a less dogmatic 
view, holding “a person who has been unjustly deprived of his property or its value or the 
value of his labor may be entitled to maintain an action for restitution against another 
although the other has not in fact been enriched thereby.”39 This formulation has been 
repeated by several courts,40 and affords the possibility of restitution outside of unjust 
enrichment.  Similarly, standard compilations of blackletter doctrine define restitution as 
“compensation, reimbursement, indemnification, or reparation for benefits derived from, 
or for loss or injury caused to, another,” which also runs contrary to the Restatement’s 
theory.41 
The disjunct between the Restatement and the law it purports to restate extends 
however beyond the term “restitution.”  Under the unified scheme, quasi contract/ 
quantum meruit present claims for unjust enrichment that do not depend on the presence 
of an actual (express) contract.  However, as several courts have pointed out, the very 
term “quantum meruit” means “as much as he deserved.”42 This orientation naturally 
 
37 Rationalizing, supra note 16,  at 1196-97. 
38 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1989); H. 
DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (Cambridge University Press 2004); Joseph Perillo, 
Restitution in a Contractual Setting, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208 (1973); Perillo, Restitution in the 
Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. (1981). In a different vein of disagreement, see PETER BIRKS,
Misnomer, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998). See also Peter 
Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1700 (2001) (citing Graham 
Virgo, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 6-16 (1999) and I.M. Jackman, THE VARIETIES OF 
RESTITUTION (1998) as disagreeing with the unitary model). 
39 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 Cmt.e. (emphasis added).  
40 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1995); Russell v. Northrop Grumman Corp. 921 
F.Supp. 143 E.D.N.Y., 1996. 
41 66 Am. Jur  2d. Restitution § 1. (emphasis added) (2004). See also Introductory Note, titled “Underlying 
Principles of Restitution” to the Restatement (Second) which states “The central idea is the conjunction of 
unjust enrichment on the one side and a loss or grievance on the other.  .  [L]iability in restitution depend[s] 
in part on the wrongful acquisition of gain and in part on [the] harm or loss wrongfully imposed.” 
(emphasis added).  
42 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1255 (7th ed.1999). For cases see, e.g, City of Mishawaka v. Kvale, 810 
N.E.2d 1129 (Ind. App. 2004); Kashani v. Tsann Kuen China Enter. Co., Ltd.,118 Cal. App. 4th 531, (Cal. 
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directs the court’s thinking towards plaintiff’s frustrated expectations rather than 
defendant’s enrichment.43 Further, the association with implied contracts has led several 
courts to assert that a claim under quasi contract requires a factual investigation as to 
whether plaintiff and defendant acted in a manner as to imply a contract; a view at odds 
with the Restatement’s position that unjust enrichment creates obligations mandated by 
law.44 The Restatement assumes that these disagreements are only skin-deep; that despite 
muddled terminology, courts essentially adhere to the principles of restitution as unjust 
enrichment. As is often the case however, terminological confusion belies a deeper 
confusion of ideas.45 
Leading scholarship is also somewhat skeptical of the Restatment’s assumption 
that restitution can be reduced to precise and positive rules.  To many, the landscape of 
restitution is a vast expanse that lacks set boundaries or fixed reference points.46 Noted 
scholars observe that “[r]estitution is an unusually flexible body of case law. . .  enabling 
judges and juries to consider many cases on their merits unhampered by doctrine.”47 The 
leading mid-twentieth century restitution scholar found that “the most obvious statement 
about the American law of restitution is that it lacks any kind of system.”48 More 
contemporary scholars note “the law of restitution is characterized by a heavy 
 
App. 2 Dist. 2004); Nextel South Corp. v. R.A. Clark Consulting, Ltd., 596 S.E.2d 416, (Ga. App. 2004); 
Ellerin & Assocs. v. Brawley, 589 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. App. 2003). 
43 Under Professor Kull’s theory, quasi contract is a claim in unjust enrichment that in no way depends on 
the existence of a contract.  Courts however often state that the quasi contract/quantum meruit permits 
recovery on the basis of an implied promise to be paid. See, e.g., Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest 
Pipeline Corp. 979 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1999). For a particularly muddled locution, see Sack v. Tomlin, 871 
P.2d 298 (Nev.1994) (“The doctrine of quantum meruit generally applies to an action for restitution . . . 
which is founded on an oral promise on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff as much as the plaintiff 
reasonably deserves. . . .”).  Further examples regarding the confusion between unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit/ quasi-contract are cited in G. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, § 1.1 n.3&4 
(Supplement 2006) See also infra at section II.D (discussing the Restatement’s gerrymandering of benefits 
in emergency services cases to maintain its conceptual modeling). 
44 Such is the law in Maine.  See Forrest Assocs. v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 760 A.2d 1041 (Me. 2000) 
(existence of quasi contract/quantum meruit is a question of fact held to the discretion of the trial court and 
reviewed for clear error). 
45 A quick perusal of the first 50 pages (the additions to § 1.1) of the latest cumulative supplement to 
Palmer’s THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, demonstrates the depth and breadth of the conceptual and 
terminological confusion surrounding restitution/unjust enrichment. 
46 Professor Doug Rendleman designates this the “broad view” of restitution, which he contrasts with the 
narrow view.  See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did 
the Smoke Get in Their Eyes 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 887-89 (1999). 
47 Stewart Macaulay, Comment, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1959).   
48 JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 111 (1951). 
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dependence on general principles,”49 and that “unjust enrichment is an indefinable idea in 
the same way that justice is indefinable.”50 Similarly, casebooks on restitution are really 
casebooks on remedies whose primary topics are the mechanics and process of 
injunctions, declaratory judgments, attorney’s fees and calculation of damages.51 This 
modeling (or the lack thereof) cuts against the rationalized conception and reinforces the 
view that restitution is a remedy imposed by courts as circumstances require, rather than 
a substantive source of rights courts are required to enforce. 52 
C. Restitution and Tort 
Nearly all restitution scholars agree that unjust enrichment presents a substantive 
basis of liability.  They disagree however, about whether restitution also contains 
elements that are solely remedial—that is, remedies that piggyback on other sources of 
common law liability, most typically, tort and contract. 53 The Restatement’s position is 
unequivocal: restitution is purely substantive.  Anytime the law imposes a restitutionary 
remedy, the defendant has necessarily been unjustly enriched.  
 
An alternative view is presented by Professor Douglass Laycock. He writes: 
 
49 Dan B. Dobbs, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (2d ed. 1993). 
50 George E. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1 (1978). 
51 See, e.g., Weaver, Partlett, Lively, and Kelly, REMEDIES: CASES PRACTICAL PROBLEM AND EXERCISES 
(2004). Restitution is the fifth chapter in this book that discusses injunctions, equitable remedies, 
declaratory judgment and issues in damages measurement.  A similar structure is found in Schoenbrod, 
Macbeth, Levine and Jung, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (3rd ed. 2002).  This book’s main titles (in 
order) are: Injunctions, Criminal and Civil Sanctions, Damages, Restitution, Collection of Money 
Judgments, Conduct of the Plaintiff and Attorney’s Fees. Interestingly, in their Note on Approaching 
Restitution Cases (724-28), the authors endorse the Restatement’s theory that restitution is a branch of the 
common law. Nevertheless this discussion is relegated to 80 pages of a roughly 1000-page casebook on 
remedies.   
The situation is a bit more balanced in Doug Rendelman, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS: (6th 
ed. 1999).  Rendelman’s chapter on “Unjust Enrichment—Restitution,” opens with a faithful recitation of 
the Restatement’s orthodoxy, and the book’s organization stresses that restitution is a branch of substantive 
liability.   Nevertheless, the discussion is situated in a casebook devoted to defining remedies delineated by 
other branches of private law.   
52 One can learn a lot about a doctrine from the company it keeps.  As implemented at the Harvard Law 
School Library, the Library of Congress classification system places substantive restitution at KF 1244, 
between insurance law and tort.  But KF 1244 contains only the Restatement and Palmer’s treatise on 
restitution and H. Dagan’s new book.  The casebooks on remedies/restitution are classified as remedies 
casebooks and placed at the tail end of the KF numbering scheme, surrounded by works on attorney’s fees, 
declaratory judgments, garnishments, federal habeas practice and standards of appellate review. 
53 Compare e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(2) (2d ed. 1993) (the substantive side of 
restitution) with id. § 4.1(4) (remedial side of restitution); GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 
?? (Little 1978); PETER BIRKS & ROBERT CHAMBERS, THE RESTITUTION RESEARCH RESOURCE, vii (1994). 
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Restitution should . . . be defined as that body of law in which (1) 
substantive liability is based on unjust enrichment, (2) the measure 
of recovery is based on defendant's gain instead of plaintiff's loss, 
or (3) the court restores to plaintiff, in kind, his lost property or its 
proceeds. Restoration in kind includes remedies that reverse 
transactions, such as rescission.54 
For Laycock, restitution is an amalgamation of two distinct legal concepts, one 
substantive (like contract and tort) and the other remedial (method to recover damages).55 
“Both usages are part of any complete definition of restitution.” Specific restitution (the 
remedial element) is “part of the core concept of restitution” that is “conceptually equal 
to the avoidance of unjust enrichment.”56 
In Laycock’s account, if a thief steals $100, and through shrewd investing 
converts it into $500, the plaintiff’s substantive claim is liability for conversion of 
the $100 in tort.  However, because getting back $500 is more attractive than the 
mere return of the $100, plaintiff will opt for restitution as his remedy for his tort.  
The same is true where plaintiff elects “rescission and restitution” as the remedy 
for a breach of contract claim.  The typical case is where the prospective seller of 
goods rescinds on the contract, only to find that the market value of the goods at 
the time of trial is lower than when the contract was formed.  In this case, the 
plaintiff will want to rewind the transaction to the status quo ante and receive his 
initial purchase price rather than price of the now devalued goods.  In these cases, 
restitution has no independent substantive basis but simply serves as plaintiff’s 
elected remedy for liability generated in tort and contract respectively.  
 
Professor Kull’s main criticism of Laycock is that the “core concept” of 
restitution is comprised of two conceptually incommensurate parts, one substantive and 
the other remedial, and that Laycock’s position “obscures the underlying unity of 
 
54 Douglass Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV 1277, 1293 (1989). 
[hereinafter Laycock, Restitution]. 
55 Subpart (1) is substantive and largely tracks Kull’s views.  Subpart (3) is remedial and is the source of 
the Kull/Laycock disagreement.  Laycock is unclear as to how subpart (2) fits in. It seems to straddle both 
categories. See Laycock, Restitution at 1285-90.   
56 Id. at 1279-80.  
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restitution’s reason and function across all of its factual settings.” 57 Rather, Professor 
Kull argues that every case of conversion results in the emergence of two separate bases 
of liability; one in tort and the other in restitution.58 And while in most cases the labeling 
is irrelevant (since plaintiff gets his $100 back in any event), where disgorgement of 
further profits is available, plaintiff is actually suing in restitution.  The commitment to 
presenting restitution as a coequal branch of the common law, forces Kull to argue that 
restitution is in play in every conversion case, even though the litigants and courts focus 
exclusively on tort elements.59 
The response to Laycock’s restitution-as-remedy for contract argument is simpler.  
The Restatement claims that it is a mistake (facilitated by the imprecision of the term 
restitution)60 to assume that the remedy titled “rescission and restitution” has anything to 
do with the branch of the common law dealing with restitution/unjust enrichment.61 
Returning the purchase price to the non-breaching plaintiff is simply a remedy for 
contract, just as replevin is a remedy for tort.  Because there is no conceptual or analytical 
connection to unjust enrichment, instances of rescission and restitution are understood as 
purely contractual remedies.  Their inclusion in the Restatement of Restitution is simply a 
concession to conventional parlance.62 
57 Rationalizing , supra note 16, at 1216, 1226. 
58 Id. at 1225-26; See also Tentative Draft No. 4, Introductory Note to Chapter 5 (§§ 40-44) at 38. 
59 See Rationalizing at 1225; Tentative Draft No. 4, Introductory Note to Chapter 5 (§§ 40-44) at 38-39, 
and Reporter’s note. 
60 In Kull’s own words, “[t]he confusion surrounding the equivocal meanings of the word ‘restitution’ is at 
its most dense in the present context.) Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 8,  “Introductory Note to 
Restitutionary Remedies for Breach of An Enforceable Contract” (§ 37 & 38) at 296.  
61 Despite Professor Kull’s rejection of the idea that these contract remedies are related to the “true” law of 
restitution, as the Reporter to the Restatement (Third) he does not feel comfortable excluding these 
doctrines, and thus they appear as §§ 37 & 38 in Tentative Draft No. 3. Their inclusion is ultimately 
justified by the fact that “readers will look for these rules in a restatement of Restitution,” and a “candid 
acknowledgment” “that we have inherited an imperfect terminology.” See Tentative Draft No. 3 
“Introductory Note to Restitutionary Remedies for Breach of An Enforceable Contract” (§ 37 & 38). 
62 Rationalizing, supra note 16, 1219-1222; see also the extended and apologetic Introductory Note 
addressing this issue. Tentative Draft No. 3, “Introductory Note to Restitutionary Remedies for Breach of 
An Enforceable Contract” (§ 37 & 38).  This view is hardly uncontroversial. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS § 344-45, 373 at Cmt. a, and id. Introductory Note to Chapter 16 Topic 4; Andrew Kull, 
Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest” 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2029-44 (2001) (analyzing 
disagreement between Professor Kull and second Restatement of Contract regarding classification of 
restitution as a remedy for breach of contract). 
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D. Restitution and Contract 
Fundamentally, restitution’s goal of unwinding transactions runs directly counter 
to the central aim of contract law—the enforcement of promised exchanges.   Thus from 
the perspective of theory, one of the central goals of the Restatement’s is to distinguish 
restitution from contract.  In fact, when compared to English and other Commonwealth 
accounts of restitution, the defining feature of the Restatement’s presentation, is its effort 
to distinguish restitution from contract and show how the two bodies of law are coexist 
and reinforce each other.63 Thus the Restatement writes, “when a benefit is conferred 
within the framework of a valid and enforceable contract, the recipient’s ability to make 
compensation is fixed exclusively by the contract.”64 Similarly, “[c]ontract is 
incomparably superior to restitution as a means of regulating most voluntary transfers 
because it eliminates, or minimizes, the fundamental difficulty of valuation.”65 Hence, 
“considerations of justice and efficiency require, therefore, that voluntary transfers be 
made pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possible.”66 In the Restatement unjust 
enrichment is a backup ground of liability which melts away in the face of a valid 
contract. 
 
Under the Restatement’s view, contract and restitution are like oil and water.  As 
Professor Kull writes: 
where a benefit is conferred pursuant to a valid contract, the 
presence or absence of unjust enrichment—the starting point of 
analysis in restitution—can only be determined by reference to the 
parties’ bargain. Because a voluntary agreement fixes the baseline 
of enrichment as between the parties, the existence of a valid 
 
63 See Steve Hedley, Restitution: Contract’s Twin in FAILURE OF CONTRACTS at 272 n.136 (F.D. Rose ed. 
Oxford Hart 1997) (pointing out that Professor Kull from amongst all the restitution scholars insists on the 
primacy of contract over restitution); Mark Gergen, Restitution and Contract: Reflections on the Third 
Restatement, 13 RESTITUTION LAW REVIEW 224 (2004) (noting that the Restatement’s commitment to the 
independence of contract law and its preference over restitution claims is significantly stronger than the 
position of Peter Birks and other leading commonwealth scholars). See also Andrew Kull, Restitution and 
the Noncontractual Transfer, 11 Journal of Contract Law 1 (1997). 
64 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 2 Cmt. c at 16. See also id. (“The application of restitution principles 
to contractual exchanges is exclusively to the consequences of performance under ineffective, or 
interrupted agreements.”). 
65 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 2 Cmt. f at 21-22. 
66 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 2 Cmt. f at 21-22. 
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contract to govern a particular transaction normally establishes a 
boundary beyond which liability in restitution cannot extend.67 
This view works its way into the blackletter rule of § 2, which finds that 
“transactions that give rise to liability in restitution . . . take place outside the framework 
of an enforceable contract, or otherwise without the effective consent of one or both 
parties.”68 The Restatement’s solution is a classic expression of the will theory of 
contract.69 Unjust enrichment must be . . . unjust.  But if the parties agreed (contracted) 
to the transaction, it is by definition just, and plaintiff has no claim in restitution.70 
The Restatement uses the contract/no contract divide to explain a number of 
results.  For example § 5 (invalidating mistake) presents the following two scenarios:  
Case 1 
A’s life is insured by B for $5000, with C as the beneficiary.  The body of a 
shipwrecked victim is officially identified as A, and C is tendered the policy 
amount.  Later, A is discovered alive.  C is liable in restitution to B.71 
Case 2 
Same facts as case 1, except B agrees to pay half the policy now, to be retained in 
any event, and the remainder if A does not reappear within two years. C is entitled 
to retain the tendered payment.72 
This distinction is justified because in Case 2 “the terms of the transaction 
constitute an express allocation between the parties of the risk that payment under the 
 
67 Rationalizing, supra note 16,  at 1200. 
68 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 2(2) (blackletter section) (emphasis added). Comment c adds:  
[The] absence of agreement, or lack of effective consent to the transaction by one or both parties, 
furnishes the common analytical theme uniting the principal headings of liability in restitution. . . 
.Where a benefit is conferred within the framework of a valid and enforceable contract, the 
recipient's liability to make compensation is fixed exclusively by the contract. . . [T]he application 
of restitution principles to contractual exchanges is exclusively to the consequences of 
performance under ineffective or interrupted agreements. These are transactions in which the 
defendant's liability to pay for a performance actually received has not been specified by a contract 
that is both valid and enforceable. 
69 The will theory of contract is developed and discussed in Duncan Kennedy, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 212-34 (unpublished 1998) available at  http://www.duncankennedy.net. 
70 See Discussion Draft § 2 Illustration 1.  
71 See id.,§ 5 Illustration 3. 
72 Id. Illustration 4. 
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policy is in fact not due.”73 While Case 1 affords B a claim in restitution, the parties’ 
contracted-for-settlement precludes restitution in Case 2.  
 
Despite the intuitive appeal of this thesis, it is difficult to sustain.  It assumes that 
a clear line demarcates enforceable, ‘live’ contracts—when restitution must take a back 
seat— from ‘dead,’ frustrated, discharged, or unformed contracts—where restitution 
applies in full force.  The difficulties with this distinction are legion, including just about 
every variation of the venerable flagpole hypothetical (where A promises B $100 to reach 
the top of the flagpole).74 Under orthodox contract doctrine, the law assumes that A 
bargained for B to reach the top of the flagpole, not for B to exert considerable effort on 
the way up.  The recurring question is what happens if A repudiates the contract before B 
reaches the top.  While the facts come in many guises—authors contracted to write books 
that are never published,75 stonemasons employed to carve statutes that are not 
completed,76 and architects retained to draw up plans that are never used—recovery is 
typically allowed.77 Yet whether these claims are understood as breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, reliance, quantum meruit, restitution, implied or constructive 
contract, has never quite been worked out.78 The line between the classic enforceable 
contract and a host of peripheral contract-like remedies is far blurrier than the 
Restatement is willing to admit.79 
73 Discussion Draft , supra note 8, § 5 Illustration 4 at 40. 
74 This view is critiqued in STEVE HEDLEY, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING, (pages…) (2001).  
75 Planche v. Colburn, 131 Eng. Rep. 305 (1831); Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. 
REV. 563, 578-80 (1981). 
76 Dowling v. McKinney, 124 Mass. 478 (1878). See John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 
B.U. L. REV. 563, 577 (1981). Id. at 580-81. 
77 Stephen v. Camden & Phila. Soap Co., 75 N.J. L. 648 (1907); Hunter v. Vicario, 130 N.Y.S. 625 (1911); 
John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. 563, 582 (1981). 
78 Compare, Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1207 (arguing these cases should be understood as contract 
and reliance claims), with Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. at 577-85 (claiming 
these actions include restitution) and Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 
COLUM. L REV. 38 (1981). 
79 Similar difficulties are raised in the pre-contractual context. Suppose in the course of negotiating a deal, 
A discloses an idea or business plan to B, which B then uses to his advantage.  Does A have a claim against 
B? Does it arise in restitution, as a tort for misappropriation of property, or is it a breach of an express or 
implied contract?  Does it matter whether the underlying transaction is ultimately consummated? Whether 
the idea qualified as a trade secret?  Would the result change if the deal was for A to license the idea to B; 
or whether the parties contemplated a sale of a business division unit employing the designated plan?  See 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed 
Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 225-40 (1987).  Mark Gergen touches on these difficulties (but 
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Perhaps the greatest source of confusion results from trying to distinguish 
between reliance (based on plaintiff’s loss) and restitution (based on defendant’s unjust 
gain) claims. 80 Both of these theories go under the guise of “quasi contract,”81 a term 
that itself generates confusion between contracts implied-in-law, which tend towards 
restitution,82 and contracts implied-in-fact, which tend towards reliance, 83 and   
ransacking the case law is unlikely to produce a clear dividing line between these two 
ideas. 84 A less conceptualistic approach, would therefore decrease the emphasis placed 
on doctrinal pigeonholes and more frankly discuss how courts routinely eschew doctrinal 
niceties to obtain justice between the parties. 85 What remains clear however, is that the 
 
defends the Restatement’s position in, Restitution and Contract, 13 RESTITUTION LAW REVIEW, 238-240 
(2004). 
80 The Restatement’s discussion of the relationship between these doctrines is fairly limited. A typical 
expression of the approach is set out at Tentative Draft No. 3 §31 Cmt. c., titled Restitution and Reliance,
which provides: 
This Section describes a liability based on the unjust enrichment of the recipient 
of the claimant's contractual performance. Restitution has sometimes been 
invoked to award what is more readily understood as a species of reliance 
damages: compensation for losses incurred in performing (or preparing to 
perform) an unenforceable contract, notwithstanding the absence of benefit to 
the defendant as a result of the plaintiff's expenditure. The more straightforward 
account of these outcomes describes them in terms of promissory liability, not as 
restitution based on unjust enrichment.  
See also Reporter’s notes to this comment and to § 23 Cmt c.  Finally, see § 26 Illustration 16 for a 
demonstration of the practical difference between reliance and restitution claims.  
81 Compare, e.g., Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 843 A.2d 758, 772 n. 9 (Md. 2004) (noting that promissory 
estoppel is a “quasi contract” claim) with Wingert and Assocs., Inc. v. Paramount Apparel Intern., Inc., 
2005 WL 1355028 (D. Minn. 2005) (“unjust enrichment claims are typically ‘quasi contract’ claims”). 
82 A typically confusing expression of this approach can be found in Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 
860 (Ind. App. 2005). (“Even if there is no express contract, a plaintiff may sometimes recover under the 
theory of unjust enrichment, which is also called quantum meruit, contract implied-in-law, constructive 
contract, or quasi contract.  These theories are legal fictions invented by the common law courts in order to 
permit recovery where in fact there is no true contract, but where, to avoid unjust enrichment, the courts 
permit recovery of the value of the services rendered just as if there had been a true contract.”) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted). 
83 See RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:6 (4th ed.2004) (“A contract implied in fact 
requires the same elements as an express contract and differs only in the method of expressing mutual 
assent.”). 
84 See Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 695 (2001) (arguing that there is no clear line between restitution and reliance); GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 97 (1995) (quasi contract [restitution] and reliance are “twins”; noting that “it 
would seem, as a matter of jurisprudential economy, that both situations could have been dealt with under 
either slogan, but the legal mind has always preferred multiplication to division.”) 
85 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 634-35 (2002) 
(suggesting a difference between promissory estoppel and restitution, but concluding that all remedies in 
cases of partially performed putative contracts are contract claims under various labels and should be 
analyzed as such).  
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line between ‘dead’ and ‘live’ contracts is far too manipulable to be of use in demarcating 
the bounds between recoveries based on the will of the parties and those based on the will 
of the state.86 
II.  The Immanent Rationality of Restitution  
 
The Restatement’s assumption that law can be made to cohere around a principle 
of unjust enrichment is a subset of a more general view regarding the “immanent 
rationality of the law.”87 This in turn rests on three related assumptions: first, that the law 
coheres; second, that it coheres around distinctly legal principles; finally, that the lack of 
coherent and organizing principles is a defect in the legal regime.   
 
A. Where do legal concepts come from? 
At the heart of conceptualism lies a concept—an idea that both describes the legal 
field and provides a normative framework for future decisions.  Less clear is where this 
concept comes from and why its proscriptions are binding on future courts.  
Conceptualists rarely confront this question openly, often relying on a less-than-fully-
articulated fusion of descriptive observations and normative claims. 88 Nevertheless, a 
basic pattern emerges.  If scholars can show that a certain concept is implicit in past 
decisions (even if the courts were unaware of it), once articulated, the concept becomes 
binding on future decisions.89 
86 See STEVE HEDLEY, Restitution: Contract’s Twin in FAILURE OF CONTRACTS 250-59 (F.D. Rose ed.  
Oxford Hart 1997) (critiquing mainstream restitution scholarship for adopting a “Victorian” model of 
contract law); but see Gergen, supra note 66 at 238-40. 
87 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). 
88 Kull himself says very little on the topic. His views about the origins of the law of restitution are limited 
to the following: 
Disagreement at this basic level about the content of the law of torts or the law 
of contracts would be unthinkable—not because these subjects have an 
immanent or ideal form (any more than restitution does), but because they have 
acquired stable conventional definitions (as restitution has yet to do). The 
nineteenth-century treatise writers defined bodies of law called “torts” and 
“contracts” that lawyers came to regard as appropriate, because the subjects as 
defined lent themselves to fruitful analysis and analogy.  
Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1194. 
89 See generally, James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business,
88 CAL L. REV. 1815, 1817-21 (2000) (describing the process through which common law concepts are 
created and applied). 
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The creation of the Restatement’s “principle of unjust enrichment” follows a 
similar pattern.  Legal analysis begins with case law.  Courts decide cases under a variety 
of rationales, some deemed correct (recovery based on unjust enrichment), while others 
incorrect (recovery based on constructive notice).90 A review of a line of cases reveals a 
recurring analytical pattern, often different from the reasoning or language employed by 
the court itself.  Legal scholars, however, recognize that these principles offer a more 
accurate account of what is “really” going on in decisional law than whatever the courts 
themselves say.  Subsequently, a large number of cases are brought together and made to 
cohere around these new principles, creating a “field,” “body” or “area” of law.  At about 
this point, the project becomes normative.  Going forward, courts are commended to 
abandon the old rationales and frame their decisions in terms of the new unifying 
principles or concepts.  Eventually, conceptualist scholars can point to cases (both past 
and present) that do not fit analytic schema and declare them “wrongly decided.”  
 
This type of argument, the most classic of the classical legal period, is as intuitive 
as it is debated.91 It assumes that, somehow, despite the well-documented irrationalities 
and misunderstandings that beleaguer the law of restitution, a coherent whole—the 
principle of unjust enrichment—successfully emerges.  Neither the misunderstood 
distinction between law and equity; nor the numerous fictions used to administer the 
common counts in assumpsit; nor bungling the contract implied-in-law/implied-in-fact 
 
90 See for example, Tentative Draft No. 1, § 12 Reporters Note to comment  (cases where property deeds 
are reformed based on a fictional theory of constructive notice are more correctly described as cases that 
prevent unjust enrichment).  
91 The literature on its contentiousness is legion. The most famous American critic of the immanent 
rationality approach is of course Justice Holmes in, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 117 (1920); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457 (1897).  Jeremy Bentham was probably the most vociferous critic. See GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM 
AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 263-301 (1986). The anti-conceptualist tradition probably has its roots 
in the works of Rudolph von Jhering, a leading German conceptualist scholar who turned his back on 
conceptual jurisprudence and became the first proto-realist.   Duncan Kennedy has identified the French 
philosopher Rene Demogue as pioneering the idea that law is a series of compromises between conflicting 
social goals (conflicting considerations) rather than a collection of elegant legal concepts. See Duncan 
Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and 
Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 111-15 (2000).  
As for its intuitive nature, virtually every brief submitted to an appellate court argues that several 
precedent cases create a “doctrine” or “framework” that applies to the case at bar.  For a scholarly defense, 
see Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241 (2000) (defending doctrinal and 
conceptual scholarship).  
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distinction; nor the terminological confusion surrounding restitution, unjust enrichment, 
quantum meruit, quasi contract, constructive contract, constructive trust, etc., were able 
to prevent the common law’s invisible hand from achieving an underlying coherence.  
Additionally, the conceptualist’s merger of descriptive and normative claims generates a 
tricky chicken-and-egg problem.  On the one hand, the concept is derived from the cases.  
Validity comes from the concept’s ability to explain a body of positive case law.  On the 
other hand, once the concept is identified and established, it can be used to critique 
decided cases and find them wrongly decided.  But if the cases generate the concept, how 
can it be used as a benchmark to accept or reject decided cases?   
 
B. Unitary Concepts  
 
To understand the Restatement’s conceptualism it is useful to compare its view of 
restitution with the analysis offered by Professor Laycock.  Laycock is undoubtedly a 
conceptualist, whose avowed purpose is to bring order and coherence to the body of 
restitution cases.92 But unlike the Restatement, Laycock does not assume that the law of 
restitution must cohere under a single unifying principle.93 This seemingly technical 
point highlights salient differences in their view of restitution, and of conceptualism more 
generally.  
 
According to Laycock, restitution is comprised of several separate bases of 
liability.  In addition to the substantive elements, Laycock finds a purely remedial 
component.94 This conceptual framing has its roots in the writings of late nineteenth-
century theorists and remains a common form of post-realist conceptualism.95 The 
classical tort writers, for example, were unable to reconcile the whole of tort law under a 
 
92 See 67 TEX. L. REV. at 1277. (“This Essay offers a conceptual and practical overview of the field. First, I 
attempt to define the concept of restitution, its principal subdivisions, and its boundaries with other bodies 
of law. Second, I attempt to identify and classify the principal situations in which restitution is of practical 
and not just theoretical interest.”) 
93 See supra notes 57-65 and text.  
94 Supra id.  
95 See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 623, 628-30 (1984) (describing core/periphery modality as a type of formalism that takes account 
of realist critiques).  
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single, unitary principle.96 Instead, they divided the law into “core” and “peripheral” 
components.  Negligence was said to be the core, while strict liability doctrines (that 
could not fit into the negligence paradigm) were shunted to the periphery.  The 
core/periphery technique advanced two important goals.  On the one hand, 
marginalization of ‘errant’ doctrines made it possible to describe the core of tort law in 
terms of negligence, ensuring that future development tended towards negligence rather 
than strict liability.  At the same time however, the peripheral doctrines eliminated the 
need to shoehorn strict liability holdings into a negligence framework.  The peripheral 
category saved the classical theorists the work of trying to fit a round peg into a square 
hole, making the overall doctrinal structure less complex and more compelling.97 
The Restatement’s principle author, however, finds Laycock’s theory incoherent, 
claiming that restitution cannot be “an apple and an orange,”98 consisting of a substantive 
basis of liability and a group of remedies for other causes of action.  Analytically, there is 
much good sense in this argument, but the insistence on conceptual unity has its costs, as 
casuistry is the price one pays for analytic coherence.  When a thief steals $100, 
Professor Kull’s argument is that liability in restitution emerges coequally with tort; even 
though it has never been thought that conversion has anything to do with unjust 
enrichment.99 The sole purpose of this posited parallel track of restitution is to maintain 
conceptual unity, and to show that restitution will emerge whenever is causative event 
occurs.  
 
The rejection of the core/periphery model is closely connected to the justificatory 
work performed by the conceptual account of liability in restitution.  The existence of 
 
96 See for example, Frederick Pollock’s discussion in the introduction to his treatise on torts. Frederick 
Pollock, THE LAW OF TORTS 1-21 (1887).  A similar methodology was used by Justice Holmes in The 
Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV 652 (1873) (attributed to Holmes by M. DeWolfe Howe in M. Howe, 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 64 (1963)), and in THE COMMON LAW at 82-163.  
97 Thus Pollock avoided having to justify why the common carrier is subject to absolute liability while most 
other hires are judged under the negligence standard.  Pollock simply claims that common carrier liability is 
anomalous or peripheral to the main line of tort law i.e., negligence.  Frederick Pollock, THE LAW OF 
TORTS 17-21.  
98 Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1216.  
99 See supra notes 61-62 and text.  Moreover, Professor Kull goes to great lengths to claim that returning 
stolen property is unrelated to restitution as unjust enrichment.  See Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1191-
92. 
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peripheral doctrines mean that the law cannot be fully rationalized in conceptual-analytic 
terms, a fact that significantly reduces the descriptive and normative strength of the 
conceptualist’s claim.  Descriptively, peripheral doctrines mean that legal concepts do not 
offer a complete explanation of the case law because factors other than analytic purity 
including the common law’s tortured history, precedent, “justice concerns,” political and 
economic motivations all impact legal outcomes.100 This in turn weakens the normative 
claim.  To the extent every case can be shown to fit into a single doctrinal structure, its 
normative claim is considerable.  Thus if unjust enrichment explains every restitution 
case, it is easy to see why non-conforming decisions are held wrongly decided.  But if 
unjust enrichment is simply a convenient way to explain many, but not all, restitution 
cases, then non-conforming rules can simply be described as peripheral.  Moreover it 
encourages seemingly unresovable debates as to what should be characterized as 
periphery and core; and just how to measure each of these categories; whether 
quantitatively or qualitatively?  Finally, at what point does the periphery swallow up the 
core? 101 
As competing bases proliferate, the normative appeal of the unitary concept 
becomes proportionally weaker.  A conclusion that there are several “headings” of 
restitution is a conclusion that “restitution” has no analytical content at all.  If the case 
law sustains three headings, what prevents future cases from creating four, five—or as 
many headings as there are cases? (The conclusion reached by the classical realists.)102 
100 For example, Pollock concluded that the strict liability standard governing “torts to possession and 
property” cannot be explained through any rational or analytic justification but that it is a function of the 
tortured history of the common law’s writ system. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 14-16 
(1887).   
101 See for example the debate between Mark Gergen and Steve Hedley as to whether the multiplicity of 
“peripheral” contract doctrines render its “core” meaningless. See Mark Gergen, Restitution and Contract, 
at 238-40.  The debates surrounding Grant Gilmore’s THE DEATH OF CONTRACT offer another pertinent 
example. 
102 In discussing Hoefeld’s critique of classical legal thought, Duncan Kennedy stated several times that 
once it is admitted that property is a bundle of severable sticks, the idea that property is a coherent analytic 
concept is dead. As related in Private Law Theory Class, delivered at HLS Spring 2005.  
This view is currently held by, STEVE HEDLEY, Restitution: Contract’s Twin in FAILURE OF 
CONTRACTS at 251 (F.D. Rose ed., Oxford Hart 1997) (suggesting that restitution has “20 or more heads of 
liability” and that the “case for the theory to unite restitution has not been made.”)  
In discussing Hoefeld’s critique of classical legal thought, Duncan Kennedy stated several times 
that once it is admitted that property is a bundle of severable sticks, the idea that property is a coherent 
analytic concept is dead. As related in Private Law Theory Class, delivered at HLS Spring 2005.  
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C. The Source of Liability 
In the conceptualist view, every instance of liability must be justified under a 
distinct analytical basis.  While in theory each basis of liability is self-contained, in 
reality, the boarders prove to be far more porous and result in multiple overlapping bases.  
As a result, conceptualist writers expend considerable effort tending the garden of legal 
concepts, ensuring that each analytic department remains coherent enough to serve its 
justificatory purpose.  
 
Take for example the discussion about the interaction between contract and 
restitution. The Restatement views these concepts as mutually exclusive and operating in 
distinct spheres, so that restitution emerges only when the contract fails.103 But cases 
where the contract fails because of frustration of purpose or change of circumstances 
(Restatement § 34), or when a dispute arises after one party has engaged in partial 
performance (Restatement § 35) amply demonstrate that whether the remedy is under 
“contract” or “restitution” is no simple matter.104 Are these cases of live i.e., operative 
contracts in need of restructuring and rehabilitation, or are they contracts that died due to 
disputes regarding performance obligations?105 
103 See for example, Discussion Draft § 2 Cmt. c. (“Where a benefit is conferred within the framework of 
a valid and enforceable contract, the recipient's liability to make compensation is fixed exclusively by the 
contract. . . [T]he application of restitution principles to contractual exchanges is exclusively to the 
consequences of performance under ineffective or interrupted agreements.”).  
104 See supra section I.D. See also Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 8,  § 34 Cmt. a at 211. The 
Restatement creates a sharp divide between contract and restitution, noting that in the case of a partially 
completed contract, “the claimant has conferred a benefit at the request of the defendant, without obtaining 
the promised exchange; enforcement of the contract is unavailable, in this case, because the parties 
obligations have been discharged.  The claimant’s recourse is a claim measured in restitution by the 
defendant’s net enrichment.”  Admittedly, one paragraph earlier the Restatement indicated that both 
obligations can coexist, stating “[i]f the obligation has been partially or wholly performed, the same 
challenge to the transaction presents what is simultaneously a question of contract and a question of 
restitution.”  In any event, the overall structure of the Restatement, (especially the insistence that restitution 
arises only when contract fails) leads me to discount this latter remark. 
105 See Tentative Draft No. 3, “Introductory Note to Restitutionary Remedies for Breach of An Enforceable 
Contract” (§ 37 & 38) (noting the disagreement between the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts regarding the relationship between restitution and contract). 
The Reemergence of Restitution 
 
28
The goal of course is not to figure out when contract dies and restitution is born.  
Neither actually happens, and the legal imagination is creative enough to issue death and 
birth certificates at a number of relevant junctures, particularly if enough money rides on 
the decision.  The important point is that this artificial discourse regarding the lifecycle of 
a contract is a product of the Restatement’s conceptualized account.   
 
While the Restatement assumes that remedies ranging from strict enforcement of 
contractual provisions, to those arising under the headings of reliance, estoppel, 
restitution, unjust enrichment quasi-contract and quantum meruit can be neatly 
categorized as stemming from contract, reliance or restitution, little in the case law 
supports this.  A more realist account finds an ad-hoc process whereby courts use a 
variety of remedies in an attempt to salvage a relationship gone sour;106 especially where 
disputes arise midstream (as in § 35).107 The conceptualist finds such untheorized 
recoveries are unpalatable, as each remedy-granting decision must fit into some larger 
category of pre-theorized liability.   
 
D. Gerrymandered Concepts 
There is no doubt that conceptualism has its advantages.  It promises a vision of 
law that is unified, predictable and rational. But conceptualism has its costs.  To maintain 
the precision, the conceptualist must gerrymander a host of sub-doctrines to make them 
fit into the larger theory.  While the law’s grey areas can be re-routed and repackaged, 
 
106 See, e.g, Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936, 938 (9th Cir. 1956) (noting confusion between contract implied 
in law and implied in fact).  See also E. A. Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 233 n.17 (1987) (noting how 
restitution and reliance claims are often interchangeable; citing Burridge v. Ace Storm Window Co., 69 Pa. 
D. & C. 184, 187 (C.P. 1949), as a pertinent example).  In the scholarly literature, the obvious citation is 
Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract. In general, this article is credited with framing off-
contract remedies in terms of reliance rather than restitution. See Kennedy, Lon Fuller’s Consideration and 
Form, 2000 COLUM. L REV. 94, 147-49, 156 (2000).  
107 See e.g, Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983) (“We should not be distracted 
by the manner in which a theory of recovery is titled. . .   Whether denominated “acting in reliance” or 
“restitution” all concur that a promise who partially performs. . . at a promisor’s request should be allowed 
to recover the fair and reasonable value of the performance rendered, regardless of the enforceability of the 
original agreement.”); see also Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 629-37 
(2002).  
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they cannot be avoided.  Conceptualism’s promise of clean and precise legal doctrine is 
never fully realized.   
 
The Restatement’s chief objective is to ground restitution in unjust enrichment—
meaning defendant’s gain rather than plaintiff’s loss.  But there is more than one way to 
measure defendant’s gain, a fact that generated considerable complexity.108 The simplest 
application of the Restatement’s theory would apply a single metric across all 
restitution/unjust enrichment claims.  For instance, the approach taken in mistaken 
benefit cases is rather intuitive.  It measures unjust enrichment in terms of the net gain to 
defendant’s wealth.   
 
Restatement § 9 Illustration 2 details:  A Railroad delivers a carload of coal to B 
that was intended for C.  A regularly delivers a similar grade of coal to B, so that B is 
unaware of the mistake.  The market value of the coal is $10 per ton, but under a long-
term contract, B pays only $8 per ton for all its coal needs. B is liable in restitution to A, 
but only at $8 per ton.109 
This case presents a clear demonstration of restitution anchored in defendant’s 
gain rather than plaintiff’s loss: “Neither market value, nor cost to the provider, reveals 
the value to the recipient where the transfer is nonconsensual.”110 Taking this theory one 
step further, the Restatement notes in a case where the recipient lacks resources or 
liquidity to purchase the uncontracted for services, restitution may be assessed at even 
less than the value of the true enrichment.111 These rules take defendant’s personalized 
circumstances into account and focus on the precise measure of defendant’s gain, 
completely ignoring issues pertaining to plaintiff’s loss.  Section 9 Illustration 2 makes a 
compelling case for restitution as unjust enrichment. 
108 See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped Off 
Dawson's Dock? 79 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2076-79 (2001) (presenting at least four different ways to measure 
unjust enrichment).  
109 Discussion Draft, supra note 8,  § 9 Illustration 2 at 106-07. This illustration is based on Michigan Cent. 
R. Co. v. State, 155 N. E. 50 (1927).  
110 Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 8,  § 9 Cmt. d. 
111 Id. 
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The Restatement’s theory becomes more difficult in other scenarios.  Section 20 
deals with the provision of emergency medical services.  Illustration 1 presents the case 
of doctor A, who is summoned to aid B, an unconscious victim.  Although Dr. A 
performs all necessary medical treatment with due care, B fails to regain consciousness 
and dies.  The Restatement rules that Dr. A is entitled restitution in the amount of his 
reasonable customary charge for similar services.112 
The Restatement is aware of the shift from actual benefits in § 9 (the coal case), to 
a fictional presumption about benefits in § 20 (the Dr. case), noting, “[s]ervices that are 
medically necessary are presumed to be beneficial without regard to the ultimate 
outcome,”113 and further, “the measure of benefit to the recipient . . . is the reasonable 
and customary charge for such services.”114 But framing this decision in terms of the 
patient’s unjust enrichment is simply unconvincing.115 First, as in nearly every quantum 
meruit scenario, benefit is measured in terms of A’s charge rather than B’s gain.  
Moreover, since B never regained consciousness, it is difficult to see what benefit was 
received.  Commentators have described the benefit in this case as “fictional,”116 as 
benefit moves from an individualized inquiry into the realm of legal presumptions.  But 
in order to square this result with the theory of restitution as unjust enrichment, the 
Restatement must gerrymander the definition of benefit as to encompass Dr. A’s failed 
rescue attempt.117 
112 Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8,  § 20 Illustration 1 at 24. 
113 Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8,  § 20 Cmt. c at 26 (emphasis added). 
114 Id.
115 Professor Kull defends this rule in his scholarly writings, but the explanation there is hardly more 
convincing.  See Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1201 note 27.  Kull argues that since a conscious patient 
would agree to pay the fee for the services regardless of the outcome, the same assumption should be made 
for the unconscious patient.  Thus to the extent that unjust enrichment is valued at what defendant would 
have paid had the transaction been voluntary, the doctor should receive his customary fee.  This 
explanation just begs the underlying question of why plaintiff’s customary fee is the appropriate measure of 
defendant’s unjust enrichment—a position at odds with the rules in the mistaken improvement context.  
Quite to the contrary, the more one looks to plaintiff’s side of the transaction, the less compelling the unjust 
enrichment theory becomes. 
116 See Christopher Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 
170 (1996) (“If the rescue effort failed, it is very hard to see the benefit to a defendant who was beyond 
medical hope and never regained consciousness. The defendant's welfare was not increased, nor was her 
estate augmented by the plaintiff's services.”). 
117 Further, arguments claiming that the overall class of B’s will be benefited by this regime are 
unconvincing.  The case in § 9 clearly shows that restitution is concerned with specific facts of the 
particular plaintiff, not overall class of persons in plaintiff’s position.  
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Beyond relying on fictional assumptions, the Restatement’s insistence on the 
unified theory requires the Restatement to gerrymander the traditional borders of 
restitution.  Frustration-of-purpose cases provide another example.  
 
The coronation cases, which deal with the fallout from the cancellation of 
coronation ceremonies for King Edward VII in 1904, offer the textbook examples of 
frustration of purpose cases.  The central question was whether persons who had rented 
rooms and barges at coronation-only rates along the processional path would be required 
to pay the contract price to watch a parade that would not occur.  While some of the 
original cases found for the vendors,118 the modern American consensus assumes that the 
purpose of the contract has been frustrated and sides with the renters.119 Frustration cases 
are traditionally understood to offer plaintiff restitution, since it would result in unjust 
enrichment for defendant to retain the contract price when the purpose of the contract has 
been frustrated.120 
The Reporter finds this explanation untenable.  Because the justness of an 
agreement pursuant to a contract is defined solely by the terms of the contract, there can 
be no unjust enrichment as long as the contract is in force. 121 For this reason, the 
“rationalized (enrichment-based) law of restitution has no independent role as a remedy 
for disputes arising out of the breach of frustration of a valid contract.”122 That courts 
have traditionally decided these cases under the restitution framework is of no concern.  
It is simply a smokescreen used “because judges [are] unwilling to acknowledge they 
[are] making contracts for the parties.”123 
118 Chandler v. Webster, 1 K.B. at 499-500 (1904). 
119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 265; 3 George E. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 7.1 
(1978). 
120 See e.g., 3 George E. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 7.1 (1978).  
121 See supra section I.D. 
122 Rationalizing, supra note 16,  at 1209.  
123 Id. at 1210. 
The Reemergence of Restitution 
 
32
What, then, explains frustrated contract claims?  While it is insisted that they 
sound in contract,124 I cam not aware that the Reporter explain why contract law allocates 
the risk to the vendor rather than the renter.  Perhaps recognizing this flaw, the 
Restatement creates a legal category even more ambiguous than restitution, claiming that 
“[d]ecisions [allocating loss to the vendor] may be more candidly explained . . .  as 
authority for the court’s power to apportion losses in an appropriate case,”125 or 
alternatively, that it is a “device to reallocate causality loss that the payment terms of the 
parties contract would have distributed inappropriately.”126 
This answer is hardly satisfactory.  The traditional approach counsels that it is 
simply unjust for the vendor to retain the coronation-only rental prices in absence of a 
coronation—a classic justification for restitution,127 but because this threatens to destroy 
the conceptual unity of unjust enrichment and inject unprincipled “equity” thinking into 
unjust enrichment, the Restatement expels frustration cases into the common law’s black 
hole.  But the desire to put one doctrinal household in order creates anarchy in another.  
While frustration cases are said to sound in contract, there is no effort to explain how 
these doctrines cohere within a rationalized view of contract law; the problem is simply 
shifted down one level. While under ‘pre-rationalized’ law, restitution/quasi 
contract/constructive trust/unjust enrichment was the catch-all heading for “equitable” 
doctrines straddling contract, tort and property, the theorized version rejects this 
description.  But to account for doctrines that fail to comport with the theoretical model, 
an even more amorphous doctrinal dumping ground is created.  The Restatement does not 
even attempt to justify this category, simply declaring that the transaction can be 
unwound pursuant to the court’s inherent “power to apportion losses.”128 
124 Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1208. (“The conventional way to describe this alternative is to say that 
the court can either deny or allow an action in restitution. Yet, either course of action turns out to be a form 
of second-order contract interpretation.”). 
125 Tentative Draft 3 , supra note 8, § 34, Cmt.d at 222. 
126 Tentative Draft 3 , supra note 8, § 34, Reporter’s notes to Cmt. d. at 223.  In yet another place Professor 
Kull seems to totally throw up his hands suggesting that these rules are simply “something else.” See 
Rationalizing, supra note 16,  at 1204.  
127 3 George E. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 7.1 (1978). 
128 Tentative Draft 3, supra note 8,  § 34, Cmt.d. 
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This discussion shows how legal doctrine is subject to a law of conservation of 
untidiness.  To use a house-cleaning metaphor, each legal method has a different way of 
dealing with doctrinal disorganization.  The realist simply assumes the law is messy and 
makes no attempts to clean it up.  Post-realist conceptualists use core/periphery 
techniques to shunt the mess over to one side of the room.  A more pedantic conceptualist 
cannot tolerate even a lone messy corner.  But the Restatement can no more avoid the 
mess than the unreconstructed realist.  The dust pile is either moved to another room 
(contract), hidden under the carpet (benefit—hiding the mess there), or just thrown out 
the window and ignored (courts’ power to apportion loses).  Doctrinal sloppiness can be 
moved, pushed aside, relabeled or walled off in a closet.  But no matter what the tactic, it 
cannot be eliminated.  
 
E. The Necessity of Conceptual Justification 
 
A final characteristic of the Restatement’s conceptualism is the degree to which it 
assumes that a rationalized analytic schema of the law is necessary.  What degree of 
coherence is required?  Can a legal rule just hang out alone in the sea of the common law 
rules, or does every rule have to fit within a larger, conceptual ordering?  
 
Again, the Restatement is premised on surprisingly strong conceptualistic 
assumptions.  Professor Kull maintains that “[a] complete account of civil liability  . . . 
requires the inclusion of restitution . . . because there are important instances of liability 
that contract and tort, conventionally defined, cannot adequately explain.”129 Further, 
restitution cases that cannot be squared with the unitary principles “require either a 
different rationale or a different result.”130 
This feature of the analysis ties together the other proclivities.  Because the law is 
inherently rational, legitimate (read, ‘correct,’) exercises of legal authority must fit into 
the law’s rational structure.  The unitary conceptual basis strengthens this approach 
 
129 Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1192.  
130 Rationalizing, supra note 16,  at 1997.  
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because each legal field is dominated by a single idea that is internally coherent and 
distinct from alternative sources of rights and duties, and allows the law to finally break 
from the holdover terminology of the pre-modern common law.  This conceptualization 
is further aided by metaphors envisioning each field as having fixed and defined 
boundaries, distinguishable both in practice and theory from neighboring doctrines and 
concepts.  Ultimately, however, the integrity and unity of the conceptual system is 
maintained only by gerrymandering the rules until they fit the theory.  
 
III.   Post-realist Conceptualism 
 
In a broad sense, the Restatement’s analytics fit into a larger movement of 
neoformalism or neoconceptualism.131 This movement is generally understood as 
conservative reactions to the excesses of Warren Court jurisprudence.  But while the 
Restatement may share many of the underlying political motivations with neoformalist 
jurisprudence, the Restatement tends towards a more classical version of formalist 
thought.132 
A.  Neo and Classical Formalism 
 
The ‘neo’ in neoformalism, suggests that it takes at least partial account of the 
realist critique.  Thus neoformalism is generally predicated on the belief that legal 
concepts are devices used to reach optimal social (or democratic) results.133 The 
 
131 In private law, the classical works are CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (Harvard University Press 1980) and Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of 
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1986). 
132 The leading (if unpublished) account of neoformalism is Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism,
Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, (Sept. 6, 1999), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=200732  4-5. Grey argues that the new formalism flows from realist, 
rather than classical formalist, premises.  Another typology of contemporary formalism is offered in 
Richard Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV 607 (1999). The larger project of articulating more 
exact definitions for various strands of formalism and conceptualism is beyond the scope of this paper.  For 
now, see Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8634 (2001). 
133 See for example Cass Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 642 
(1999) (analyzing contemporary formalism and hypothesizing that “it is the disagreement over the 
underlying empirical issues—not over large concepts of any kind— that principally separates formalists 
and nonformalists.”).  
The Reemergence of Restitution 
 
35
justifications for neo-formalism are expressed in terms of the practical and political 
benefits of formalist adjudication and less in inherentist terms about the objective truth, 
necessity or coherence of the conceptual account of law. 134 While Professor Kull 
explicitly rejects the idea that restitution has an ideal, platonic form,135 the Restatement’s 
analysis pulls in the opposite direction. To take but one example, the insistence on the 
unitary conception of restitution has little to do with obtaining specific results in actual 
cases.  It is rather motivated by the view that restitution as a concept will be rendered 
meaningless if it is comprised of both remedial and substantive components.136 
The distinction between two shades of formalism accounts for some of the 
differences between the Restatement and other accounts of unjust enrichment.  So long as 
courts reach consistent and predictable results, neoformalists are unlikely to express a 
preference as to whether the court formally relies on quasi contract, reliance, restitution, 
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, express contract, implied contract or any other 
doctrinal heading.  But this is exactly the point to which Professor Kull’s project is 
addressed, “[t]he argument here, it bears repeating, is not about what judges do, merely 
about the most useful way to describe what they do.”137 This thinking recurs in the 
 
134 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). Other 
elements of Justice Scalia’s approach are outlined in Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary 
Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 589 (1990) (describing legal concepts as “fictional”, but then 
arguing that “[w]ithout such a system of binding abstractions, it would be extraordinarily difficult for even 
a single judicial law-giver to be confident of consistency in his many ad hoc judgments; and it would be 
utterly impossible to operate a hierarchical judicial system, in which many individual judges are supposed 
to produce equal protection of the laws.”) 
135 Kull, Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1194. 
136 For example, Professor Kull writes: 
 No legal topic can long survive this degree of professional neglect. Unless the 
means are found to revive it, restitution in this country may effectively revert to 
its pre-Restatement status, in which problems of unjust enrichment were treated 
in isolation, classified only by transactional or remedial setting: Mistake, 
Indemnity, Trustees, Subrogation. The loss to American law, measured in terms 
of its ability to yield coherent and reasoned adjudication, has already been very 
great, and the outlook is not encouraging. 
Rationalizing , supra note 16, at 1196. 
137 Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1224. See also id. at 1222 ( “The distinction [between Professors Kull 
and Laycock] moreover, is of no immediate practical significance.”) 
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Restatement’s insistence that, while it is often the case that restitution and contract 
produce the same results, the two categories are “distinguishable in concept.”138 
Finally, from the functionalist perspective, there is no reason to insist on a single 
analytic construct to account for the entire law of restitution.  Two or three, perhaps even 
four or five elements would do just as well.  In fact, several restitution scholars view the 
doctrine of restitution as encompassing several independent analytical bases of 
liability.139 As long as the doctrinal heading facilitates the law’s functional purpose, 
there is no reason to force a square peg into a rounded hole.  And, if the law does not 
frustrate settled expectations, does it really matter whether restitution is said to be made 
up of three sub-doctrines?  The need for precise legal boundaries, the inability to accept a 
core and periphery model, and the need to gerrymander and exclude nonconforming 
doctrines are all expressions the Restatement’s interest in the conceptual structure of 
restitution.  
 
B. Legal and Pre-Legal Categories 
The conceptualism of the Restatement’s perspective on restitution contrasts with 
nearly every innovation in legal thought and scholarship in the past two generations. 
Maturing and emerging fields include: animal law, art law, health care law, child law, 
elder law various forms of cyber and computer law, disability law, environmental law, 
Indian law, natural resource law, lawyering for the President, terrorism and the law, 
WTO law—to name but a few. 140 But in contrast to restitution, these areas have not 
 
138 “[W]here the contract price of the benefit conferred is the same as the value of the benefit as determined 
by the court, the recipient’s liability in restitution—while distinguishable in concept—may be identical in 
extent to a liability on the invalid contract.”).Tentative Draft No. 3 § 33 Cmt.d, at 186 (emphasis added). 
139 Professor Laycock offers three separate bases, see Douglass Laycock, The Scope and Significance of 
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV 1277, 1279-81 (1989), while Professor Wonnell offers four separate bases, see 
Christopher Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 191 
(1996).  
140 Taken from the Harvard Law School course catalogue (2006). For example, with respect to animal law 
see www.law.harvard.edu/news/2001/06/13_animals.php (announcing Harvard Law School’s receipt of 
endowment to support teaching and research in the emerging field of animal rights law.); 
www.law.umich.edu/_ClassSchedule/aboutCourse.asp?crse_id=038599 (describing University of Michigan 
Law School’s course in animal law); see also, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS (Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum 
eds.) (Oxford University Press 2004). 
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arisen because scholars have finally unearthed some central conceptual principle 
underlying each area of the law.  Quite to the contrary, they are based on the perceived 
significance of the relevant social/political institutions, or on the understanding that 
recurring patterns of transaction and organization warrant the law’s attention.  Thus while 
under a more traditional arrangement, sports law breaks down into the law of contracts, 
anti-trust, agency, remedies, labor and employment, Title IX, business organizations, 
agency, local government law, torts, health and disability and intellectual property law; 
fusing these rules into sports law gives primacy to the social rather than legal 
classification. 
 
The Restatement moves in the opposite direction. Instead of framing restitution in 
terms of family law, banking law, consumer protection, mass tort litigation, local 
government law, trust and estates, insurance law, securities regulation, corporate law, and 
others, the Restatement adopts the legal-analytical category of unjust enrichment.  This is 
more in line with the classical scheme of legal thought when law was considered in terms 
of tort contract, agency, partnership, bailments sales, property, equity, and trusts; the 
doctrinal subjects that have largely have fallen out of scholarly favor 
 
This tendency is echoed in the debate of whether and how restitution fits into the 
law school curriculum, where the legitimacy of offering a law school course on 
restitution seems entirely dependant on whether one accepts the conceptual account of the 
field.141 Those who argue that restitution forms an important heading of liability 
backing up contract and tort, typically lament restitution’s (non)status in the law school 
curriculum.  Conversely, scholars who assume the “law of restitution” to be illusory 
typically resist calls to devote curricular space to doctrines spelling out quasi contractual 
and equitable liability.  As a point of contrast, it is hard to imagine how the rise or fall of 
sports law would have anything to do with the coherence of the central principles 
 
141 See, Michael Kelley, It’s Not My Job, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 887 (2002) (describing debate as to whether 
and where restitution fits in the law school curriculum);  Rationalizing, supra note 16, at 1196 (arguing that 
restitution can be saved from obliteration by framing it in terms of a core idea of unjust enrichment); see 
also STEVE HEDLEY, Restitution: Contract’s Twin in FAILURE OF CONTRACTS at 260 (F.D. Rose ed., 
Oxford Hart 1997) (noting that restitution is “being sold to its potential audience purely on the strength of a 
theory said to lie behind its materials”).  
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underlying sports law.  Similarly, constitutional law is taught and studied not because it 
has a conceptual core, but because the doctrines collected under that heading are of 
foundational importance to American law.  So while Larry Tribe recently concluded that 
he can no longer identify any unifying principles in constitutional law, no expects 
constitutional law to disappear from law school course offerings.142 In a variety of ways, 
the legitimacy of restitution is entirely bound up in the debate regarding the conceptual 
coherence of the proposed analytic category. 
 
C. Contrast: The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
 
A final dimension of the Restatement’s conceptualism is highlighted by 
comparing the Restatement of Restitution with the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a work 
that struggles to present a conceptual account of tort law.  While the first two 
Restatements of Tort collected all of tort law into a single work, the most recent project 
divide torts into three separate areas.  The ALI first issued the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Apportionment of Liability and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
The initial plan was to balance the doctrinal fragmentation of tort law by issuing a third 
work titled Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles.143 This project was to 
focus on the conceptual core of tort law, reaffirming the unifying themes in an area that 
had come to require three separate projects.   
 
When the ALI got down to writing the General Principles drafts there was little 
consensus as to what the core of tort law is, or whether such a concept even existed.144 
Initial drafts assumed the core or model tort was a negligent accident between two 
strangers resulting in physical harm.  But this decision invited scholarly criticism.  Some 
scholars questioned why these “stranger accidents” should be considered the model tort, 
 
142 See Larry Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291 (2005).  
143 See Harvey Perlman and Gary Schwartz, Overview by the ALI Reporter, General Principles, 10 FALL 
KAN J. LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (2000); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM, Reporter’s Introduction (Proposed Final Draft 2005). 
144 See generally Symposium: The John W. Wade Conference on the Third Restatement of Torts, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 639-1467 (2001). 
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and why cases such as professional malpractice lay outside mainstream tort law.145 
Others questioned why tort law should be limited to physical harm at all, advocating the 
inclusion of emotional and economic harm into the core of torts.146 Unable to resolve 
these issues, the ALI revised the scope and goals of its project.  Successive Restatement 
(Third) of Torts drafts abandoned the hope of coming up with general principles of tort 
law.  An intermediate draft bears a more modest title: Restatement (Third) of the Law of 
Torts, Liability for Physical Harm: (Basic Principles),147 while the most recent draft 
drops the pretense of generality altogether, bearing the title, Restatement (Third) of the 
Law of Torts Liability for Physical Harm.148 This latest draft apparently assumes that 
there is no “core” of tort law and that rules governing physical harm cannot claim priority 
over the Apportionment and Products Liability projects.  The failure to come up with any 
mutually agreeable general principles of tort raises questions as to whether the category 
“tort” has any substantive content.   
 
Unlike the Restatement of Restitution, the Restatement of Torts express anxiety 
over the explanatory powers of legal doctrine.  One of the most debated issues in the 
drafts was the role of duty, long understood as one of the doctrinal pillars of tort law.149 
The drafts exhibit deep skepticism over the operative impact of duty, and present 
negligence as a three-element tort (negligence, causation and damages) shorn of the 
traditional duty inquiry.150 Duty, per the Restatement of Torts, is only to be considered 
in “unusual”151 cases, and ordinarily, “is . . . a nonissue.”152 Overall, the Restatement of 
 
145 See John C. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in 
Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2001). 
146 See Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751 
(2001). 
147 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative 
Draft No. 1 March 28, 2001); See also Tentative Drafts No. 2 (March 2002), Tentative Draft No. 3 (April 7, 
2003, and Tentative Draft No. 4 (April 2004), which all bear the same title.   
148 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft 2005). 
149 See John C. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in 
Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2001); David Owen, Duty Rules 54 VAND. L. REV. 767 (2001); 
Robert Rabin, Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2001). 
150 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: General Principles § 3 (Discussion Draft 1999). 
151 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: General Principles § 6 (Discussion Draft 1999). The 
blackletter section states in full: 
Even if the defendant's negligent conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiff's physical harm, the 
plaintiff is not liable for that harm if the court determines that the defendant owes no duty to the 
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Torts presents a more functional account of legal doctrine.  Rather than gerrymander 
doctrines into a single conceptual framework, the Restatement of Torts is willing to alter 
or discard longstanding doctrine, and conclude that no single idea unifies the entirety of 
tort law. 
 
Finally, there are significant differences in the political economy of the private 
legislatures responsible for producing these two projects.  By nearly all accounts, the 
Restatement of Torts has been a deeply political affair.153 Debates within the ALI 
meetings have largely mirrored tort-reform debates in public legislative bodies, where 
academics supporting competing industry and consumer interests vie for influence over 
the final product.154 This invariably frames the discussions in terms of outcomes and 
sustainable compromises, correlatively deemphasizing doctrinal elegance and analystic 
coherence.  The meetings and debates surrounding the Restatement of Restitution have by 
contrast been far more academic affairs.  There has been little if any, interest group 
participation, and the Reporter has been given an unusual amount of freedom to pursue 
his vision of restitution.  Participants note that the meetings have focused more on 
coherence, elegance and analytics while interest group and industry politics have been 
marginal.155 
plaintiff. Findings of no duty are unusual, and are based on judicial recognition of special 
problems of principle or policy that justify the withholding of liability. (emphasis added). 
152 Id. at § 6 cmt.  
153 See, e.g., Patrick Lavelle, Crashing into Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design: The Fallacy of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (2000) (Products Liability 
project should have resulted in an academic and scholarly product, reflective of the lofty standards to which 
the ALI previously subscribed. . .  However, this project, infected as it was with. . . improper influence, has 
produced nothing more than a position paper reflecting the views of special interests groups with whom the 
selected reporters are aligned.”); Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALI 
Members in Drafting the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1998) (outlining and decrying 
politicization trend in the drafting of restatements). 
154 For a general discussion of the political economy of Restatement projects, see Allan Schwartz and 
Robert Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995), see also id. at  
648-50, for a discussion of the Restatement of Products Liability (discussing the various interest groups 
involved in the torts restatement projects). 
155 See Mark Gergen, The Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Midpoint, 56 
Current Legal Problems 289, 291 n.10 (2003).(noting the unusual degree of deffernce and 
autonomy given to the Reporter of the Restatement)  I have also interviewed spoken at length with 
Colleen Murphy (October 2005) a member of the Consultative Group to the Restatement who  
noted the lack of interest group participation and the doctrinal nature of discussion, particularly as 
compared to other restatement meetings).  
The Reemergence of Restitution 
 
41
IV. Why Do Concepts Matter? 
 
Does the conceptualization of restitution actually make a difference?  Does 
playing around with doctrinal labels and headings lead to different results?  What are the 
stakes of the Restatement project?  
 
The stakes of the Restatement’s version of doctrinal restructuring are not 
immediately apparent.  The circular relationship between the conceptual underpinning 
and the actual case law means that the Restatement cannot demand a broad shift in 
overall results, since, if too many cases turn out to be “wrongly decided,” it becomes 
unclear whether the concept, rather than the cases, require reconsideration.156 Moreover, 
the Restatement project has a descriptive rather than normative emphasis, and in most 
cases it seeks to explain why judges do what they do rather than argue for a different set 
of results.  
 
On its own terms, the Restatement is silent on this issue.  While it vigorously 
argues for a renewed understanding of restitution, we learn little about what is in the 
Restatement that is not included in the restatements of contracts, torts, trusts and property.  
Nor is the Restatement specific as to what is practically to be gained by arranging the 
existing rules under the framework of restitution-unjust enrichment. 
 
Finally, the foundational questions are pretty much settled and beyond reproach. 
Neither the Restatement’s version of restitution, nor any competing framework is likely 
to challenge the central holdings, (at least not in a project that purports to restate existing 
law). The differences in result therefore lie at the margins of existing caselaw, usually 
where one of two innocent parties must bear a loss caused by a judgment-proof third 
party who is actually at fault.  The chief contribution of rationalized restitution is to 
display a stronger preference for rewinding transactions, and to give less weight to the 
countervailing considerations of finality of transaction or to shifting the loss to the party 
 
156 See supra note __.  
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at fault. In theoretical terms, a nudge in the direction of categoric reasoning and a shift 
away from the instrumentalism that lies at the heart of cost-benefit analysis.  
 
B.  Restitution and Bankruptcy 
One difference between theorized and untheorized restitution comes to light by 
considering the intersection of federal bankruptcy law and common (state) law doctrines 
of constructive trust, which the Restatement classifies as restitution.  A constructive trust 
declares that money or property in B’s hands really belongs to A, and that B must turn it 
over to A.  For example, suppose that through geological survey A determines that some 
Balckacre sits stop a valuable gold mine. To finance the purchase Blackacre A seeks a 
loan from B, telling B of Blackacre’s potential value. B denies the loan and proceeds to 
buy the Blackacre for himself. Courts will find that B holds the property as constructive 
trust for A, typically demanding both land and profits to be turned over to A.  
 
The hard question is what if B goes into bankruptcy.  In addition to A, B is likely 
to have a long line of creditors demanding satisfaction from B’s assets, mine included.  Is 
the mine A’s property, so that he gets pull it out of the bankruptcy estate and be repaid in 
full? Or must A wait in line like, and likely get only a small percentage of the mine’s 
value.  This is where the restitution theory comes in.  
 
The untheorized view is likely behind the Sixth Circuit’s decision finding that A 
must wait in line with the other creditors.157 The court claimed that unlike a real trust 
(which is certainly outside the bankrupt’s estate), “a constructive trust is a legal fiction, a 
common law remedy in equity that may only exist by the grace of judicial action.”158 
Since the constructive trust is a remedy given as justice demands, it creates no “real” or 
“hard” rights in the property.  While this palm-tree justice might be appropriate as 
between A and B, the court found that when the policies of federal bankruptcy law are at 
stake, discretion must give way to law. Therefore a court must “necessarily act very 
cautiously in exercising such a relatively undefined equitable power in favor of one group 
 
157 In re Omegas Group, Inc.,16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994). 
158 Id. at 1449. 
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of potential creditors at the expense of other creditors, for ratable distribution among all 
creditors is one of the strongest policies behind the bankruptcy laws.” 159 
Not surprisingly, the conceptualized view, finds much fault in this analysis.160 In 
re Omegas fails to recognize that “restitution is the body of law that settles a property 
dispute between the claimant and the offending debtor and, at a secondary level, between 
the claimant and the creditors.”161 Far from seeing a conflict, pro-restitution scholars 
argue that restitution, (along with contract, tort and property) forms the baseline rules 
against which the federal bankruptcy code is written.162 Courts must address state-law 
ownership questions first, only afterwards moving on to the distribution policies enacted 
in the Code.  Since A owns the mine, neither B, nor its creditors, have any claims to A’s 
property.  
 
C. Mistaken Payments 
A lack of respect for the law of restitution is demonstrated in a variety of 
transactional patterns involving wire transfers. 163 An oft-debated New York case 
provides a simple illustration.164 Company A tells its Bank, B, to wire $1M over to 
creditor C. The message gets garbled so that B sends $1M over C but sends another 
million to a different creditor, C2.  B then asks for the money back from C2 who refuses, 
arguing that a debt was due. A then becomes insolvent, so that B’s only recourse is 
against C2.
Restitution starts with a presumption that transfers based on mistake are voidable 
and that B bank ought to prevail, unless C2 can show some reliance on the funds, known 
more technically as a “change of position” defense.165 In policy terms, restitution 
 
159 Id. at 1453 (citing In re North American Coin & Currency, Ltd, 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
160 E.g., Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
265 (1998). 
161 Id. at 286. 
162 See, e.g., id. at 266-70. 
163 See, e.g., Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Intl., 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991); General Electric Capital 
Corp. v. Central Bank, 49 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.); Credit Lyonnais v. Koval, 745 So.2d 
837 (Miss.1999). 
164 See Banque Worms, id. 
165 See Andrew Kull, Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. REV. 919 (2001). 
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scholars argue that as between B and C2, C2 has assumed the credit risk of A’s 
insolvency, while B was only paid a few hundred dollars to wire over the money.166 
The New York court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that C2 can retain 
the money, and thereby placing the loss on B.167 Each of the court’s arguments is 
premised on a law-and-economics analysis which is in tension with the central aims 
restitution.  First, the court held that in the world of the instantaneous high finance wire 
transfers, “efficiency, certainty and finality” are paramount values so that courts must be 
exceptionally reluctant to rewind a completed transaction.168 Second, taking a page from 
tort law, the court found that since B was the cheapest cost avoider of this mistake, in 
order to encourage precaution in the future, the loss should lie with the bank B.  In a case 
raising similar issues, Judge Easterbrook argued that the bank is in a better position to 
contract around this result by seeking indemnities of distribution of wire transfers gone 
awry.169 
Professor Kull’s diagnosis of the differences between a restitution-based analysis 
and the view offered by these courts is on the mark.  
 
The goal of finality emphasizes the undesirable effects that will 
flow from the mere possibility of reopening a completed 
transaction. Restitution starts from a contrary perception: that. . . 
the avoidance of unjust enrichment justifies not only the cost of 
judicial intervention to reopen a transaction that would otherwise 
be over and done with, but also the cost of the additional 
uncertainty inevitably resulting from the mere possibility of such 
intervention.170 
Lacking a formalized “law of restitution,” the courts saw this case through the 
eyes of tort and contract which, (as understood by law and economics scholars), 
emphasize the cheapest cost avoider and display the overall preferences for transactional 
efficiency and finality. As a body of law, restitution brings the opposite polices to the 
 
166 Id. 
167 Banque Worms, 570 N.E.2d. at 196.  
168 Id. at __. 
169 General Electric, 49 F.3d at 284-85. 
170 Rationalizing, supra note 16,  at 1234. 
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fore. “If all persons who negligently confer an economic benefit. . . are disqualified from 
[] relief because of their negligence, then the law of restitution, which was conceived in 
order to prevent unjust enrichment would be of little or no value.171 While simply 
declaring that a case is decided under the law of restitution does not answer any hard 
policy questions, restitution is less impressed by arguments of finality and efficiency, and 
over the run of cases, will likely reverse a greater number of transactions than under 
competing methodological frameworks. 
 
D. Tobacco Litigation 
The preceding examples present restitution in fairly confined terms, limited to the 
technical field of commercial transactions.  However, whether intended by the 
Restatement or not (and probably not), adoption of the Restatement is likely to give 
plaintiffs’ lawyers broader ambitions, and in a way that seems unique to American 
lawyering, counsel will employ restitution to embark on large-scaled social policy 
making.  
 
A compelling analysis of restitution’s role in the Mississippi tobacco litigation is offered 
by Professor Doug Rendleman.172 For years, the tobacco industry successfully defended 
against tort and product liability claims pursued by smokers and their families.173 
Eventually, plaintiffs changed tactics, making the plaintiff the state rather than the 
smoker, and the legal theory restitution rather than tort.174 Combining law and 
economics thinking with classical restitution, the plaintiff-States claimed that the tobacco 
companies were unjustly enriched because they did not internalize the costs of the 
adverse health effects endured by the smokers.  According to the States, since the public 
fisc paid for these expenses through Medicare and related programs, the States were 
entitled to restitution from the tobacco companies.175 
171 Ex Parte AmSouth Mortgage Co., 679 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 1996); See also Tentative Draft No.1, ,
supra note 8,  § 5 Cmt (discussing the role of negligence in restitution claims).  
172 See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke 
Get in Their Eyes 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999). 
173 Id. at 848-58. 
174 Id. at  852-86. 
175 Id. at 853.  
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Rendleman finds the dispute between the States and the tobacco industry to be 
about the characterization of the legal claims.176 The States’ goal was to show that 
restitution was an independent basis of substantive liability having nothing to do with 
tort; making the industry’s long string of wins under tort law irrelevant a claim under 
restitution.  By contrast, the tobacco companies argued that restitution could not provide 
a remedy unless there was a wrong in tort, and that the States were simply presenting old 
(and losing) claims under a new dress.  
 
Though the restitution theory was never sanctioned by a court, it played a role in 
producing one of the first major victories against the tobacco companies.177 While, even 
academic sympathizers found the States’ claims beyond the pale,178 the tobacco bar 
recognized that substantive restitution claims significantly changed the dynamics of 
tobacco litigation. The industry folded its cards and recorded its first major loss.179 
The tobacco case demonstrates why legal categories matter.  If an “area” of the 
law called restitution exists, lawyers will expect it to contain some substantive content—a 
set of doctrines unique to restitution.  Since restitution clusters at the margins of contract 
and tort, it is likely to become a repository for claims that fail under the orthodox 
conception of tort and contract.  Restitution has the potential of making new land 
available for lawyers populate with innovative theories of recovery, and the resulting 
growth nudges the balance of the private law rules towards those seeking more expansive 
recoveries.180 
E. Is restitution pro-plaintiff?
176 See id.
177 This is not to deny other factors in reaching the decision, e.g., the fact that the state rather than the 
smoker was plaintiff, the resources amassed by the plaintiffs, and the shifting attitudes towards the 
industry’s responsibility. It is of course impossible to claim that the same result would not have been 
reached under an indemnity theory or by finding a new duty in tort. Nevertheless, the legal topology 
offered by restitution makes this result easier to reach and contributed to the new paradigm of successful 
tobacco litigation.  
178 See id.
179 Id. at 864-74.  
180 Two immediate examples are claims for holocaust and slavery reparations based on restitution theories, 
see (cites).  
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Two important qualifications must be added to the previous discussion.  First, 
under the Restatement, restitution is not simply a glorified label for helping out the little 
guy.  In a number of transactional patterns, the strong restitution ethic embedded in the 
Restatement clearly accrues to the benefit of large commercial interests.  Consider a case 
where an insurance company pays out a life insurance policy on the basis of the 
company’s incorrect interpretation of the policy’s terms.  While under a  line of cases 
dating back to 1858 (and supported by a leading treatise) the insurance company is 
deemed to have waived any claims based on contract interpretation,181 the Restatement 
however, interprets this as a paradigmatic mistaken payment case and grants the 
insurance company a claim in restitution.182 
The second reservation addresses whether plaintiffs maintain a greater or lesser 
chance of recovery under the Restatement’s concept-driven framework. While the 
Restatement’s formalization of doctrines at the margins of contract, tort and property and 
is likely to increase recovery, the Restatement’s strict adherence to the classical will 
theory of contract pulls in the opposite direction.  
 
Under the Restatement’s scheme many of the “soft” doctrines of contract 
(mistake, fraud, duress, undue influence) are taken out of contract and reclassified as 
providing restitution for unjust enrichment.  This move allows the Restatement to 
simultaneously account for the doctrines that falsify the classical ideal of contract, while 
at the same time reaffirm the classical version of contract and its primacy ina system of 
 
181 Mutual Life Insurance Co v. Wager, 27 Barb. (NY) 354 (Sup. Ct. 1858) (when an insurance company 
pays a claim, it “must be deemed, by the payment, to have settled, or waived all questions of law or fact as 
to the validity of the original contract. . .  which they had the means of raising before they paid the loss”). 
See also Palmer, § 14.14.  This basic view was affirmed more recently, in Universal Acupuncture Pain 
Services v. State Farm, 196 F.Supp.2d 378 (SDNY 2002), which denied restitution to the insurance 
company for payments made to an acupuncture clinic that was unlicensed, and therefore not entitled to 
insurance payments under state law. (“[Payee] may not have been eligible for the benefits in the first place, 
but good conscience entitles it to retain the money paid for services rendered.”). Under the Restatement’s 
view, this result can be explained under the bona fide creditor rule. See Tentative Draft No. 1 § 6 comment 
(i) and Illustration 35. 
182 See Tentative Draft No. supra note 8,  134-35, § 6 Illustrations 22-23 & 25.  Of course, even under the 
Restatement’s formulation, a liberal view of change of position will result in the insurance company 
sustaining the loss. Nevertheless a prima facia case of restitution is available.  
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private ordering.183 When denuded of its corrective measures, contract law is recast in its 
classical mode and requires strict and unequivocating adherence to the terms of the 
supposed bargain.  
 
The consequence of this view can be seen in cases of unilateral mistake.  Under 
the typical fact pattern, a seller drastically undervalues the property offered for sale, 
while the buyer who is aware of the true value is eager to make the deal.  Despite the 
Restatement’s fairly capacious conception of mistake within the law of restitution, since 
the contract is ostensibly valid and in force, per the Restatement’s view that the contract 
set the baseline of unjust enrichment, the seller must fulfill his bargain.184 While this 
approach is consistent with the Restatement’s analytic premises as well as nineteenth-
century contract doctrine,185 it is at odds with developments reflected in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts,186 and the leading restitution treatise.187 These later authorities 
offer a muddier distinction between restitution and contract, which allows the seller to 
back out of the sale on an undifferentiated contract-restitution theory.  By contrast, by 
expelling mistake from the law of contract, and insisting on a sharp conceptual separation 
between contract and restitution, the Restatement would seemto require performance in 
these cases.188 
V.   The Continuing Resonance of Classical Legal Thought 
 
The preceding sections demonstrate how the Restatement relies on a classical 
variant of legal argument that hearkens back to the scholarship of the late nineteenth 
 
183 This move is made most clearly in Kull, 11 JOURNAL OF CONTRACT LAW.
184 Tentative Draft No. 3 , supra note 8, § 34, Illustrations 23 & 24. See also Andrew Kull, Unilateral 
Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57, 74-77 (1992). 
185 See e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 15 US 178 (1817 (Marshall, C.J.) court refused to rescind contract 
for sale of tobacco where seller knew that British naval blockade would be lifted due to the signing of 
Treaty of Ghent and prices would rise sharply while buyer was unaware). 
186 See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §153;  
187 2 Palmer § 12.3 at 554-56. 
188 Compare Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 8,  § 34 Illustrations 23 & 24 with Restatement (Second) 
Contracts § 153; more explicitly, see Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 57, 74-77 (1992). 
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century.  The conclusion explores why the Restatement looks to reprise a method legal 
scholarship that has been out of fashion for nearly one hundred years.189 
At the most basic level, the Restatement’s posture is grounded in the need to 
assuage fears that restitution will generate new avenues of liability in areas deliberately 
foreclosed by existing contract, tort and property doctrine.190 Such fears are not wholly 
unwarranted, as restitution is comprised mainly of “soft” and potentially redistributive 
doctrines which historically have teetered at the margins of contract and property.  By 
pulling these doctrines out of the traditional fields, the Restatement offers a conception of 
contract and property that are untainted by soft law.  Moreover, the conceptualized and 
rulified account of unjust enrichment shows how even soft law belongs to a formalized 
body of law based on the predictable application of legal rules.   
 
Though this positivization thesis goes some distance, it fails to adequately explain 
deeper connections to classical formalism presented in the Restatement. A classic law-
and-economics styled treatment of remedies, or a post-realist description stressing rule-
of-law-concerns would likely accomplish much the same result. 191 
The attraction of classical formalism, however, extends beyond rule-based 
predictability. Conceptual jurisprudence allows the Restatement to overcome its major 
hurdle—introducing a new theory under the guise of “this is what courts have been doing 
all along.” This posture is especially important in the case of the Restatement of 
Restitution, which by its own argument, looks to reframe existing doctrines under a new 
theory.  
 
It is important to recall the difference between restitution and legal innovations 
spawned by new governmental regulation (ERISA law), technology (internet law), or the 
 
189 See Duncan Kennedy, Consideration and Form, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000). 
190 See supra Section IV.  
191 Some examples of less conceptually adamant accounts of restitution include, Laycock, Restitution;
Christopher Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 170 
(1996); HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS  OF RESTITUTION (Cambridge University Press 2004). A 
more law and economics approach can be found in Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 
65 (1985).  
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increasing visibility of certain industries (sports law).  Unlike these new areas of law, the 
principle cases discussed in the Restatement are quite dated, many of its illustrations 
having a quaint texture to them.  Further, the Restatement scarcely takes into account the 
interventions of the regulatory state, and little thought is given to how securities and 
banking regulations, or even the UCC, impact restitutionary principles. Many of the 
Restatement’s rules are already accounted for in other restatements, 192 and finally, the 
differences between the Third Restatement and its seventy year-old predecessor are more 
terminological than substantive. 193 
It is precisely the tension between the newness and oldness of the Restatement 
makes the conceptual framing particularly useful. It allows the Restatement to explain 
why even though its contents are rather old, overt discussions of restitution and unjust 
enrichment have heretofore been largely absent from both legal opinions and scholarly 
discourse.194 Conceptualism answers that while the presentation of the theory might be 
new, the underlying concept of unjust enrichment has been directing judicial 
decionmaking all along.  Thus, despite the absence of the unjust enrichment theory in the 
case reports, the Restatement’s exposition is can be said to present an accurate 
restatement of American law.  Even more important are the substantive implications of 
this argument. Conceptualized restitution neither expands entitlements nor redistributes 
rights in contract or property, rather, it simply offers a more sophisticated explanation of 
existing judicial practices. 
 
A related impulse stems from the Restatement’s ambitions to not only restate, but 
also recreate an entire field of common law.  Though a “field” is little more than a 
collection of doctrines, the idea that a new area of common law can be created ex nihilo 
192 Cite sections that are duplicative of the Restatement (Second) Contracts.  
193 See Hedley, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING (2001) (commenting on the Goff and Jones 
Treatise) (final chapters).. 
194 See for example PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 3 (Clarendon Press 
1985) (Comparing the late development of administrative law and restitution, noting that “restitution is the 
more remarkable of the backwards pair. . .  because while the caselaw of Administrative law might be said 
to have been called into existence only by the increasingly assertive role of the modern state, restitution is a 
central concern of ordinary private law and has been the subject of litigation for as long as the common law 
has been developing “). 
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creates anxieties in a way that tweaking or restating or pre-existing law does not.   Given 
the current aversion to judicial (or even worse, scholarly) legislation, the more restitution 
can be shown to be connected, integral and inherent to the law, the greater the chances of 
acceptance. Again, classical formalism adds a degree of naturalness and immanence 
lacking in the more pragmatic strands of neoformalism, and puts forward the imagery of 
the law’s three gears interlocking in some master mechanism.   
 
Finally, we might consider the perceived differences regarding both the origin and 
legitimacy of restitution. The case for ERISA, disability law and most other new areas of 
law is fairly straightforward.  Each body of law is the product of a specific act of 
regulation that has little to do with the coherence, elegance or even justness of enacted 
rules. ERISA rests solely on positivist grounding.  It is binding and legitimate because 
Congress said so.   
 
When directed at the law of restitution, the same question proves far more 
difficult to answer.  While the debate has been raging for centuries, a consistent strand of 
thought anchors the legitimacy of private law in the justness, coherence and even 
naturalness of its principles.195 At least at the level of rhetoric, private law is also 
understood as foundational law, i.e. the legal principles that serve as the basis for more 
specialized areas of law. 196 (This likely explains their presence in the first year 
curriculum). No statute imposes the law of restitution, and no social/technological 
development demands its intervention.  Therefore, its legitimacy and relevance relies 
substantially on a sense of coherence and authenticity.  For this reason, an account that 
 
195 This idea is quite common amongst civilian scholars, who for centuries have given analytical preference 
to “real” law---that is law derived from Justinian’s Institutes as opposed to the native and legislated law of 
the jurisdiction. This distinction holds, even though the legislated social law is of far greater importance in 
practice. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 36-43 (2d Ed. 
1993); J.H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 7 (Michie 
Co. 1969).  Unjust enrichment was a core category of the Roman law and hints of this approach resonate 
throughout the entirety of the restitution literature. In the contemporary common law discourse, E. 
Weinrib’s THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW is probably the clearest expression of this thesis.  
196 See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, NYU J. OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (discussing how contemporary transnational institutions that are not connected to a 
sovereign state frequently make recourse to private law reasoning and the legitimization technicians of 
rational coherence and conceptual ordering); See Christian Joerges, The Science of Private Law and the 
Nation-State (European University Institute 1998) (discussing the role of conceptualist private law though 
in the creation of nation states). 
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elegantly binds seemingly disparate and conflicting rules on the basis of conceptual 
formality, logical order and principled reason is particularly attractive to the law of 
restitution.197 
* * *
In the post-realist landscape, American legal thought has generally been skeptical 
of conceptualist legal argument.  The charge of “transcendental nonsense” is the knee-
jerk response to an argument predicated on the authority and coherence of the legal 
category, and since Holmes, elegantia juris is more of an epithet than a compliment.198 
Yet, as the Restatement project demonstrates, classical conceptualism continues to hold 
powerful sway over the contemporary legal imagination.   
 
Writing in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the legal historian F.W. 
Maitland claimed that while “[t]he forms of action we have buried . . . they still rule us 
from their graves.”199 Duncan Kennedy has argued that much the same applies to 
classical legal thought, which continues to provide the structure of private law 
jurisprudence.200 Despite nearly a century of unrelenting criticism, the classical model of 
a coherent and integrated private law field continues to provide the baseline through 
which restitution is constructed and evaluated.  Classical legal thought may have long lost 
its original justification and explanatory plausibility, but like many theological and ritual 
motifs, it remains etched into the lawyer’s mind as the most basic paradigm of legal 
thought still provides a sense of security, authenticity and continuity. 
 
197 See Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 31-
36 (2000); (discussing the attraction of systemic accounts of the law); Daniella Caruso, supra note __. 
198 See Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 17-
18 at n.13 (2000) (noting that while Cohen’s article is the 72nd most cited work ever published in a law 
review, in the seventy years since its publication, it has never been subjected to thorough critique); Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. U. L. REV. 609, 631(1879) (critiquing 
the jurisprudence of elegance).  
199 F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law: A Course of Lectures 2 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. 
Whittaker, eds., 1936). 
200 As related in Private Law Theory Class, delivered at Harvard Law School, Spring 2005; see also James 
Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CAL L. REV. 1815, 
1820 (2000).  
